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I. INTRODUCTION
Washington State has twice had a graduated personal net
income tax,' and at least four times the state has had some
form of graduated corporate net income tax.2 Each of those
measures was passed by the Washington State Legislature or
by popular initiative between 1929 and 1935. Each time, how-
ever, the Washington State Supreme Court declared either
that the enactment violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution 3 or that the income tax was a prop-
erty tax and thus violated the Washington State Constitution's
requirement that all taxes be uniform upon the same class of
property.4 Repeated attempts to amend the state constitution
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1. A graduated personal net income tax was first enacted in 1932 as Initiative 69
by a vote of 322,919 (70.2%) yes to 136,983 (29.8%) no. 1933 Wash. Laws 5. A second
version of a graduated net income tax was approved by the legislature in 1935. 1935
Wash. Laws 178; see also infra notes 79-84, 158-65 and accompanying text.
2. A franchise tax on certain banking and financial corporations, measured by net
income, was adopted by the legislature in 1929. 1929 Wash. Laws 151. Initiative 69 also
provided for a net income tax on corporations, and in 1935 the legislature again
attempted to put a corporate income tax into place by enacting 1935 Wash. Laws 180.
The last time a corporate franchise tax measured by net income was passed was in
1951. 1951 Wash. Laws 10.
3. In Aberdeen Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536, reh'g
denied, 157 Wash. 391, 290 P. 697 (1930), and Burr, Conrad & Brown, Inc. v. Chase, 157
Wash. 393, 289 P. 536 (1930), the Washington State Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the
1929 net income tax on financial institutions violated the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. See infra notes 66-71, 220-47 and accompanying text.
4. Initiative 69 was overturned by a 5-4 decision in Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash.
363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933). The 1935 personal net income tax was similarly found by the
same five justices to violate Article VII, Section 1, of the state constitution in Jensen v.
Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936), and the 1935 corporate net income tax
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to permit those taxes failed,5 leaving the state with an unusual
tax system that has not changed in basic structure since 1935.
Washington's tax system relies principally on a gross
receipts business and occupations tax (the "B&O tax")," on
property and leasehold excise taxes,7 and on retail sales and
use taxes.' Although Washington State and its local govern-
ments are supported by at least fifty-six different taxes,9 in
1988, 48.1% of Washington state and local tax revenues were
from either retail sales or use and B&O taxes (over twice the
national average of 23.9%); 28.5% of state and local revenues
were from property taxes (compared with a national average of
29.9%); and various other sources made up the difference.10
Nationwide, income taxes generate over a quarter of state and
local tax revenues (26.3% in 1988), but Washington is one of
only four states with neither a corporate nor a personal net
income tax."
Washington's tax structure is frequently criticized for
being regressive,'12 discriminating in favor of the low-volume,
was invalidated in Petroleum Navigation Co. v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 495, 55 P.2d 1056
(1936).
5. Unsuccessful attempts to amend the Washington State Constitution to permit
the imposition of net income taxes include H.J.R. 32 in 1934 (43.4% of the electorate
voting yes, 56.6% voting no); S.J.R. 7 in 1936 (22.2% yes, 77.8% no); S.J.R. 5 in 1938
(33.1% yes, 66.9% no); H.J.R. 4 in 1942 (31.3% yes, 68.7% no); H.J.R. 42 in 1970 (31.5%
yes, 68.4% no); and H.J.R. 37 in 1973 (22.1% yes, 77.1% no). Washington State
Archives, Olympia, Washington.
6. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 82.04 (1989).
7. Id. chs. 84, 82.29A.
8. Id. chs. 82.08, 82.12.
9. RESEARCH DIVISION, WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, TAX
REFERENCE MANUAL (1991).
10. GOVERNOR'S COMMITrE ON WASHINGTON'S FINANCIAL FUTURE, A FINANCIAL
PLAN FOR WASHINGTON 6-7 (1989) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S REPORT].
11. As of 1988, only Washington, Nevada, Texas, and Wyoming were without any
type of state net income tax. JAMES L. MCINTIRE, INTERSTATE COMPARISON OF
BUSINESS TAXES: STATE AND LOCAL TAXES WITH AN INITIAL BURDEN ON BUSINESS
Table A-2 (University of Washington Institute for Public Policy and Management
1988). See also ROBERT P. STRAUSS, A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE TAX STRUCTURES FOR
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON Tables 3-6 (Carnegie-Mellon University Center for Public
Financial Management 1987).
12. The retail sales tax is clearly the most regressive. According to STRAUSS,
supra note 11, at 51, Washington residents in the lowest fifth by income pay over 7% of
their income in state sales taxes, while residents in the highest fifth pay less than 2%
of their income in sales taxes. The Washington State Department of Revenue found
that in 1988 a family of four earning $20,000 paid about 8.7% of their income in state
and local taxes of all kinds, while a family earning $125,000 paid 6.9%. GOVERNOR'S
REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-10. See also CITZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, THE SORRY STATE
OF STATE TAXES (Jan. 1987), a study which concluded that Washington had the
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high profit industries to the detriment of high-volume, low-
profit businesses, such as retail enterprises."i Washington's tax
structure is also criticized for being too volatile and elastic,
causing plunges in state tax revenue during recessions.' 4
Washington's tax structure costs residents a valuable federal
income tax deduction available to people in the forty-three
states that levy an income tax.15 The tax structure encourages
Washingtonians to pursue cross-border purchases that evade
the state's high retail sales tax.'" And the state's tax structure
seventh most regressive tax structure in the country, principally because of the
reliance on various types of sales taxes.
13. Because the B&O tax is imposed on the gross receipts of businesses, including
receipts from transactions between businesses during the manufacturing process or as
products move from resource extraction through manufacturing, wholesale and retail,
there is ample opportunity for multiple taxation of the same commodity or portion of a
commodity. A smaller portion of the cost of items produced by vertically integrated
firms will represent B&O taxes, and those businesses will pay a disproportionately
smaller share of that tax. STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 49. The GOVERNOR'S REPORT,
supra note 10, at 6-9, asserts:
Since the [B&O] tax is measured by gross receipts, rather than profits as in
most other states, it has been criticized for failing to recognize ability to pay.
It favors low volume, high profit firms and adversely burdens high volume,
low profit firms. Further, it tends to favor vertically integrated firms, which
conduct manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing functions within the same
company, because the tax is only imposed on final sales. Approximately one-
third of Washington's businesses make no profit, yet these firms pay about 18
percent of the B&O tax.
Washington's heavy reliance on the retail sales tax has led to similar criticism of that
source of governmental revenue. See STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 46-51; MCINTIRE,
supra note 11, at 28-30. Those studies also point out that the many exemptions pro-
vided from sales and B&O taxes, and the large differences between the B&O tax rates
paid by different industries, contribute to the tax burdens that vary significantly
among types of businesses. For example, the GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-
9, states that although the B&O tax has only three principal rates, "the effective tax
rates in terms of book income vary widely, from 2.4 percent for restaurants to 39.3 per-
cent for auto dealers."
14. Although the stable nature of the property tax, and Washington's substantial
reliance on that tax, has kept governmental revenue generally stable over the long
term, "Washington's tax system appears to suffer abnormally during periods of
economic recession, mainly due to the fall-off in taxable retail spending."
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTmENT OF REVENUE, TAx BASE GROwTH AND STABILITY: A
COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF WASHINGTON'S MAJOR TAx SoURCES 1976-1985, 5
(1986); see also MCINTIRE, supra note 11, at 33-35.
15. The federal Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 134(a)(1), abolished
the deduction for state and local sales taxes, retaining a deduction for state income
taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 164 (1988). The Washington State Department of Revenue
estimated in 1989 that the loss of sales tax deductibility costs Washington residents
$120 million per year in increased federal taxes. GoVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 10,
at 6-11.
16. The retail sales tax ranges between 7% and 8% in Washington counties
bordering on Oregon and Idaho. Oregon has no retail sales tax, and Idaho's is 5%. The
GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-15, points out that this "situation presents a
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is plagued by uncertainty because of the susceptibility of the
B&O tax to periodic legal attacks on interstate commerce
grounds.'7 Still, some observers maintain that Washington has
a fundamentally stable system, a system with taxes that are
not particularly high overall," a system where businesses, not
individuals, bear a disproportionate share of the initial tax bur-
den,' 9 and a system where the status quo tilts toward aero-
space, timber, aluminum and other large, integrated
industries, which is a positive benefit to the economic well-
being of the state's residents.20
This Article does not debate whether Washington's
existing tax structure is sound or whether an income tax is the
right solution to any inadequacies in the state's system of taxa-
tion. Instead, this Article shows how, because of changes in
key rulings of the United States Supreme Court and in other
tremendous incentive for Washington residents to evade the sales tax," causing the
state tax revenue losses of $22 million each year and local jurisdiction revenue losses
of $4.7 million annually. Out-of-state purchases also adversely affect the level of local
economic activity in border counties. Id.
17. The B&O tax provides various credits to prevent its invalidation on the
grounds that it interferes with interstate commerce, but out-of-state businesses have
from time to time launched assaults on that tax, sometimes successfully. See, e.g.,
Tyler Pipe Industries Inc. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987),
which overruled in part General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), and
caused a modest restructuring of the B&O tax. See also Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467
U.S. 638 (1984), overturning West Virginia's gross business receipts tax.
18. The studies cited supra notes 10, 11, and 14, point out that despite
Washington's difficult tax times during recessions, over long periods the state's tax
revenues keep up with growth in personal income. In addition, measured as a
percentage of personal income, Washington's state and local taxes are not particularly
high. For the 1987 fiscal year, Washington's state and local taxes were $114.99 per
$1,000 of personal income, which was 19th from the highest among all states. The
national average state and local tax burden was $114.79 per $1,000. GOVERNOR'S
REPORT, supra note 10, at 6-7; see also McINTiRE, supra note 11, at 4 & Table 3.
19. Washington business as a whole appears to carry a disproportionate share of
the state's initial tax burden. MCINTIRE, supra note 11, at 6, concludes that
Washington is "a high business tax state," ranking eighth nationally in the share of
total taxes that initially impact business, and seventh in the level of business taxes per
$1,000 of personal income. Mclntire found that in 1986 initial payments of taxes by
Washington businesses accounted for 43.8% of all state and local revenues, compared
with 34.6% nationally. Id. Although business taxes in many industries can effectively
be passed on to customers, the fact that in most states individuals bear a higher direct
tax burden has probably not been lost on Washington voters, who in recent years have
rejected fundamental changes in the state's tax structure. See notes 5, 157 and
accompanying text.
20. McIntire points out that many states' tax systems reflect the needs of their
dominant economic activities. He has found some evidence of influence by businesses
in the state but concludes that the influence is not dramatic. MCINTIRE, supra note 11,
at 29.
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state court rulings on the character of income taxes, Washing-
ton's legislature could now implement a graduated net income
tax on both individuals and businesses. The Article concludes
that such a net income tax measure could lawfully be enacted
by today's legislature without amending the state's
constitution.
First, this Article reviews the history of Culliton v.
Chase21 and Washington's other key 1930s anti-income tax
cases, and describes the social and economic forces that led to
the adoption of Washington State income taxes as well as the
successful legal attacks on those measures that followed. Sec-
ond, this Article illuminates the social and legal philosophies
underpinning the various opinions in Culliton and shows that a
key misunderstanding (or misconstruing) of "net income"--as
a static asset ("property") rather than a concept measuring an
activity or flow-caused the court to eviscerate a new, liberal
voter-approved constitutional provision and change it back into
a restrictive version. This Article then outlines how since the
early 1930s the United States Supreme Court has gradually
reversed or altered the cases relied on by the Culliton major-
ity, and how other state courts in the country that had a simi-
lar view of income as property (inaccurately labeled in
Culliton as the "overwhelming weight of judicial authority" 22)
have revised their interpretations, leaving only Washington
and perhaps one other state23 with a tax system that has been
accurately described as "rather unique. "24
This evaluation of Culliton and its sister decisions is not
the first. Indeed, as soon as Culliton was handed down it came
under sharp academic attack,' and that case and its progeny
have been critiqued on several other occasions, often persua-
sively.26 But changes in the United States Supreme Court's
21. 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1983).
22. Id. at 374, 25 P.2d at 82.
'23. Pennsylvania, with a uniformity-of-taxation constitutional provision different
from Washington's, remains the only other state that continues to maintain that
personal net income is a form of property and that taxation of that income therefore
constitutes a type of property tax. Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971), discussed
infra notes 321-22 and accompanying text; see also WADE J. NEWHOUSE,
CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 2015-18 (1984).
24. STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 5.
25. See, e.g., Harold Hestnes, Comment, Constitutionality of State Income Taxes, 8
WASH. L. REV. 81 (1933).
26. See, e.g., J. Thomas Carrato & Richard W. Hemstad, Income Taxation in
Washington In a Class by Itsef, 1 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 255 (1978); Alfred E.
Harsch, The Washington Tax System-How It Grew, 39 WASH. L. REV. 944 (1965)
19931
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view of certain issues that formed the underpinnings of Wash-
ington's income tax cases, as well as a change in what now
clearly is the "overwhelming weight of judicial authority"'  in
other states, makes the time ripe for a reevaluation of whether
a graduated net income tax is currently permissible under
Washington's constitution. Such a tax may or may not be good
policy, but that is a determination for legislators to make, not
judges or scholars.
II. TAx UNIFORMITY CLAUSES: A CLASH OF ECONOMIC
INTERESTS
Taxation is generally viewed as a fundamental, necessary,
and sovereign power of government,2s but there is rarely unan-
imous agreement on who should bear the taxation burden and
how taxation should be applied.-" Taxes on property, both real
and personal, have played a key role in financing state and
local government in America since before the American
Revolution.30 When the states were first established, six of
them adopted constitutional provisions that, in effect, required
every person to carry his "fair share" of the tax burden.3
Some of those provisions read as though they were lifted
directly from John Locke, as perhaps they were.32 But not all
[hereinafter Harsch, Washington Tax System]; Alfred E. Harsch & George A.
Shipman, The Constitutional Aspects of Washington's Fiscal Crisis, 33 WASH. L. REV.
225 (1958); James V. O'Conner & Robert E. Schillberg, Comment, A Study of State
Income Taxation in Washington, 33 WASH. L. REV. 398 (1958).
27. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 374, 25 P.2d 81, 82 (1933).
28. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1931), in which
Justice Stone wrote that state taxation is "the most plenary of sovereign powers, that
to raise revenue to defray the expenses of government and to distribute its burdens
equally among those who enjoy its benefits."
29. One is reminded of the famous observation attributed to former Senator
Russell Long: "Don't tax me, don't tax thee, tax the fellow behind the tree." Quoted
in Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing Good or Doing Well? Congress
and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 891, 896 (1987) (reviewing JEFFREY
H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH: LAWMAKERS,
LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPHS OF TAx REFORM (1987)). However, as
Doernberg and McChesney point out, Senator Long's "axiom summarizes the typical
attitude about taxes, except that most taxpayers do not care if the system does tax
'thee,' so long as it does not tax 'me.'" Id.
30. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1702 et seq.
31. Id. at 1702-04.
32. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Americans active in
government read and relied on the political theories of the liberal English philosopher
John Locke (1632-1704). See WILLIAM B. SCOT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN
CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 37
(1977). In Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 408 (Mentor Books 1965), Locke wrote,
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states had constitutional clauses requiring that taxes on prop-
erty be "uniform" or "equal." In 1834, just nine of twenty-four
states (38%) had such provisions, but by the eve of the Civil
War, that number had jumped to twenty-three out of thirty-
four states (68%).3' While one commentator has labeled the
origin of such provisions "obscure,"' the call for uniform taxa-
tion clauses appears to have been regularly included among the
demands of the Jacksonian democratic movement.35
In the United States, the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury saw an explosion of manufacturing and transportation,
the creation of much new wealth, and an increase in the dis-
parity between rich and poor. This caused a backlash from the
small farmers and independent craftspeople who formed a
majority of the population, but who saw their lives and welfare
challenged by the industrial enterprises; they saw transporta-
tion companies and financial institutions dominating the young
nation's economy.3 6 Along with attacks on licensed monopo-
lies, demands for broadened suffrage, and pressure for univer-
sal and inexpensive public education, equal taxation of all
property was a typical platform plank of Jacksonian political
groups.3 7 These groups were critical of tax exemptions and
special low tax rates received by canals, railroads, and other
key actors in the industrial expansion.38 A movement for "uni-
formity and universality" resulted, insisting that all property
should be taxed, and taxed equally: commercial, industrial,
and financial property as well as agricultural land.39
Among the many legacies of this political movement was
the increase in uniformity-of-taxation clauses throughout the
'Tis fit everyone who enjoys his share of the protection [of government] should pay
out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it." This thinking is reflected,
for example, in the original 1780 Massachusetts constitution, in which Article X, of
Part the First (Declaration of Rights) provided that "[e]ach individual of the society
has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property,
according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the
expense of this protection; .... " Quoted in NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 608.
33. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1730.
34. William J. Matthews, Jr., The Function of Constitutional Provisions
Requiring Uniformity in Taxation, Part I, 38 Ky. L.J. 31, 49 (1949-50).
35. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1730 et seq., particularly at 1734.
36. Scorr, supra note 32, at 53 et seq.
37. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1733-34.
38. Id. See also JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD OF LIBERTY 276-77,
302-05 (1982).
39. Sumner Benson, A History of the General Property Tax, in GEORGE C. S.
BENSON ET AL., THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX: ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT 31 (1965); Matthews, supra note 34, at 44-45, 520.
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American states. By the end of the nineteenth century, forty-
one of the forty-five states (91%) had some sort of uniformity
clause, including the new state of Washington that entered the
union in 1889.4 There was a wide variety of constitutional uni-
formity provisions to choose from. Professor Newhouse has
identified twelve distinct categories of language requiring uni-
formity or equality of taxation, which he has labeled Type I
through Type XII, roughly in order of their development his-
torically.4 As discussed below, the differences among these
types of uniformity clauses are critical to the proper interpre-
tation of their meaning.'
Picking from forms then common among other states,
Washington started with a combination Type V clause ("All
property shall be taxed in proportion to its value") and a Type
X clause ("The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation").' Adopted as part
of Washington's constitution in 1889, Article VII, Section 1,
stated:
All property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed in
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by
law. 4
Article VII, Section 2, stated:
The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal
rate of assessment and taxation on all property in the state,
according to its value in money, and shall prescribe such reg-
ulations by general law as shall secure a just valuation for
taxation of all property, so that every person and corpora-
tion shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or
45its property ....
The type of uniformity clause initially chosen by Washing-
ton worked well enough for a predominantly agricultural com-
munity in which land was the most significant form of
property.46 Article VII, Sections 1 and 2, were modeled on pro-
40. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1716.
41. Id. at 1699-1701; see also Benson, supra note 39, at 37 et seq.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 317-22.
43. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1544.
44. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (amended 1930).
45. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (repealed 1930).
46. In 1900, six out of ten Washingtonians lived on farms. However, by 1930 only
four out of ten lived in rural areas, and just two of ten actually lived on farms. Philip
J. Roberts, Of Rain and Revenue: The Politics of Income Taxation in the State of
[Vol. 16:515
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visions passed earlier in the century by predominantly agricul-
tural states.47 But many Washington taxpayers, along with
those in other states, found that as the twentieth century
progressed, constitutional strictures requiring that all forms of
property be taxed equally and uniformly were hurting asset-
based businesses, including farming.4 At the same time, other
types of commerce that might have few assets but high profits
did not appear to bear their "fair share" of the tax burden.49
Furthermore, intangibles were difficult to locate and tax, and
it was believed that separate classifications of property would
permit intangibles to be taxed at lower rates, thus encouraging
payment.5°
In the century's first tax codes, Washington State and its
local governments continued to rely heavily on the property
tax during a period when demand for governmental services
was growing. As a result, real estate taxes nearly doubled in
the decade prior to 1920.51 Farmers realized that they were
paying high taxes on land that in many years was unprofitable,
while the financial institutions upon which they relied for
annual loans were paying relatively low taxes.52 This led to a
statewide movement that followed a national trend toward lib-
eralization of uniformity clauses so that different classes of
Washington 1862-1940, at 13, 202 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Washington); Harsch, Washington Tax System, supra note 26, at 952-56.
47. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1720.
48. Roberts, supra note 46, at 146, 188; REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON TAX
INVESTIGATION COMMISSION 8, 42-43 (1930) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
49. Roberts, supra note 46, at 156-57.
50. Benson, supra note 39, at 64.
51. Roberts, supra note 46, at 146.
52. Id. at 156-58; Harsch, Washington Tax System, supra note 26, at 956. For a
short but illuminating exposition of the pressures on Washington's tax structure
caused by economic changes in the state and the growth of government in the early
twentieth century, see Petition for Rehearing of the Tax Advisory Comm'n at 2-3,
Aberdeen Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536 (1930) (No. 22228),
reh'g denied, 157 Wash. 391, 290 P. 697 (1930), in which the Commission offered the
following history and argument:
The tax system of Washington, in the main, was established when the
ownership of real and tangible personal property was a fair measure, if not
the only measure, of taxpaying ability. This system imposed almost the entire
cost of government upon the owners of real and tangible personal property.
At the time of the adoption of the state constitution such a tax system
equitably spread the burden of taxation over all of the citizens of the state
with taxpaying ability as well as any system that then could have been
devised, and rightly so, for the functions of government were then confined
entirely to the protection of life, liberty and property.
Since statehood the scope of government has expanded beyond bounds
that then could have been contemplated. Likewise the forms of wealth of this
524 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 16:515
property could be taxed in different ways and at different
rates.' This national movement picked up steam during the
Progressive Era and into the Depression; during the period
from 1911 to 1937, it was a rare year that did not see one or
more states amend their constitutions to overhaul their tax
system. 4
In Washington State, tax reform demands were expressed
in several ways: first, for a change in Article VII, Sections 1
and 2; second, for a cap on property taxes; and third, for an
implementation of a net income tax. Each of these measures
was placed before the voters and was overwhelmingly
approved in the following years. In 1929, the Washington State
Legislature proposed constitutional Amendment 14,5 which
was approved by the state's voters during the November 1930
election.' Amendment 14 struck the first four sections of
Article VII and replaced them with a new Section 1 that read
as follows:
The power of taxation shall never be suspended, surren-
dered or contracted away. All taxes shall be uniform upon
the same class of property within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax and shall be levied and collected
for public purposes only. The word "property" as used
herein shall mean and include everything, whether tangible
or intangible, subject to ownership. All real estate shall con-
state have changed along with the expansion and development of the
economic life of its citizens....
Many states have met this enormous increased cost of government by
providing methods of taxation whereby the tax burden is equalized so that all
citizens, including corporate entities, are subject to taxation in proportion to
their ability to pay and according to the benefits received. This is conceded by
economists as the basic principle of taxation.
See also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 48, at 40-44. That report is discussed infra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
53. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1717 et seq., records that Virginia started the
trend in 1902 with a new constitution that contained a Type XI clause permitting the
classification of subjects of taxation and requiring uniformity only within each class of
subjects. This approach of classifying property so that taxes could be levied differently
on various classes was adopted by Minnesota through a 1906 amendment, and it was
included in Oklahoma's constitution upon admission in 1907. The movement gained
speed with the 1911 adoption of a Type XII clause in North Dakota ('"taxes shall be
uniform upon the same class of property"), and between 1911 and 1937 at least 24
states altered their constitutions' uniformity of taxation clauses. In the same period,
another ten states expressly exempted income taxes from the strictures of their
existing uniformity clauses. Id.
54. Id
55. Amendment 14, 1929 Wash. Laws 499 (approved Nov. 1930).
56. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1988).
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stitute one class: Provided, That the legislature may tax
mines and mineral resources and lands devoted to reforesta-
tion by either a yield tax or an ad valorem tax at such rate
as it may fix, or both. Such property as the legislature may
by general laws provide shall be exempt from taxation.
Property of the United States and of the state, counties,
school districts and other municipal corporations, and credits
secured by property actually taxed in this state, not exceed-
ing in value the value of such property, shall be exempt
from taxation. The legislature shall have power, by appro-
priate legislation, to exempt personal property to the
amount of three hundred ($300.00) dollars for each head of a
family liable to assessment and taxation under the provi-
sions of the laws of this state of which the individual is the
actual bona fide owner.5 7
Those advocating an express ceiling on property taxes in
1924 coalesced around an organization called the Federation of
Taxpayers and began gathering signatures to place on the bal-
lot an initiative limiting property taxes to 40 mills per dollar of
assessed valuation.M1 The first attempt was unsuccessful, fall-
ing short of the required number of signatures, but a final peti-
tion drive placed the proposal on the 1932 ballot, and in that
year's general election a 40-mill limit was adopted by passage
of Initiative No. 64.59 Virtually identical ballot measures were
repeatedly readopted until 1944, when an amendment
entrenched the 40-mill limit in the state's constitution.' °
In Washington and elsewhere in the country, income taxa-
tion was being advocated to ensure that no one avoided his or
her "fair share" of the burden. A federal income tax had been
briefly instituted during the Civil War but was allowed to
expire," and an 1894 federal tax passed by Congress in
57. Amendment 14, 1929 Wash. Laws 499 (approved Nov. 1930) (italics in original)
(codified at WASH. CONST. amend. XIV (1988)).
58. Roberts, supra note 46, at 148-49. The unsuccessful 1924 initiative, as well as
the later successful versions, also required that for tax purposes property would be
assessed at 50% of its "true and fair value." Thus, in effect, that property tax ceiling
was 20 mills. Harsch, Washington Tax System, supra note 26, at 958.
59. 1933 Wash. Laws 4.
60. WASH. CONST. amend. XVII (1944) (amended 1972, 1976, 1986). The 1972
amendments (amendment 55 and amendment 59) removed the 40-mill limit and
established the principal that property was to be assessed at its full value for tax
purposes. WASH. CONST. amend. LV (1972); WASH. CONST. amend. LIX (1972)
(amended 1976, 1986).
61. Federal Income Tax Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 432-89 (1862)(reenacted several times
until its expiration in 1872).
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response to Populist demands (and over the vociferous protests
of conservative business interests) was overturned as unconsti-
tutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.6 2 But finally,
after enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution in 1913, a relatively low rate federal income tax was
promptly put into effect. 3
In Washington State, the Grange and other farm groups
were the driving force for a net income tax, arguing that it
would reduce property taxes and require profitable urban busi-
ness and financial interests to contribute their appropriate
share of the costs of government." The rural dominated
Washington State Senate passed an income tax bill in 1929, but
it died in the House during the legislative session's closing
hours, angering farmers who believed that the bill had been
hijacked by big business interests unwilling to pay reasonable
taxes.6
The 1929 legislature did adopt a corporate franchise tax
measured by net income,6 but the bill provided liberal exemp-
tions for large urban commercial banks. When the mutual sav-
ings banks that served many farmers and other "little people"
challenged the franchise tax on federal equal protection
grounds, the Washington State Supreme Court overturned it in
two six to three decisions: Aberdeen Savings & Loan Assoc. v.
Chase67 and Burr, Conrad & Broom, Inc. v. Chase. As dis-
cussed below in detail,69 Aberdeen, the lead case of the two,
raised the question of whether the tax was on property rather
than an excise or corporate privilege tax.70 At that time, the
court did not examine the characteristics of "property" and
62. 157 U.S. 429 and 158 U.S. 601 (1894). For background on the 1894 federal
income tax, see NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1935 et seq.
63. Pub. L. No. 63-16, § II, 38 Stat. 113, 166-81 (1913).
64. Roberts, supra note 46, at 190-92, 196-97; see infra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text. Part of a national agricultural movement, the Washington State
Grange's first chapter was organized as the "Patrons of Husbandry" in 1873. The
Grange was, and remains, an organization devoted to the social and political welfare of
farmers. Roberts, supra note 46, at 101-02; Gus NORWOOD, WASHINGTON STATE
GRANGERS CELEBRATE A CENTURY (1988).
65. Roberts, supra note 46, at 158.
66. 1929 Wash. Laws 151.
67. 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536, reh'g denied, 157 Wash. 391, 290 P. 697 (1930).
68. 157 Wash. 393, 289 P. 551 (1930). The companion cases to Aberdeen and Burr,
Conrad & Brown, Inc., were Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. Chase, 157 Wash.
698, 289 P. 555 (1930), and United Diversified Securities Corp. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 699,
289 P. 554 (1930).
69. See in;fra text accompanying notes 220-57.
70. Aberdeen, 157 Wash. at 361, 289 P. at 541.
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"income," but it did conclude that the federal Fourteenth
Amendment had been violated, while expressly declining to
address whether the measure would be permissible under the
uniform taxation provisions of the state constitution then in
effect.7'
The 1929 legislature had also provided for appointment of
a "blue ribbon" Tax Advisory Commission to work jointly with
the State Tax Commission and make "a thorough and compre-
hensive investigation and study of the entire subject of taxa-
tion."72 Governor Roland Hartley, who strongly opposed an
income tax, nevertheless appointed the group, which included
nine members representing agricultural, commercial, and
industrial interests.73 After a "careful and exhaustive investi-
gation of the subject of taxation," including hearings in eight-
een cities and towns,74 the joint commission recommended
both a graduated personal income tax and some form of busi-
ness income tax to provide property tax relief.7 5 After power-
ful Grange lobbying in 1931, both measures quickly passed the
overwhelmingly Republican Senate and then gained House
approval.7" Governor Hartley vetoed both bills, labeling them
special interest legislation, which he said was "rapidly bringing
about confiscation of property by taxation. '7 7 The Governor's
veto, together with an attempt to eliminate the State Tax Com-
mission (all three members of which were fellow Republicans),
contributed to already deep splits within the state Republican
71. Id. at 373-74, 391-92, 289 P. at 536, 545; 290 P. at 697-98.
72. 1929 Wash. Laws 127. This statute created an advisory tax commission that
was charged with carrying out its work in conjunction with the permanent State Tax
Commission. The joint body was known as the "Washington Tax Investigation
Commission." Id. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 48.
73. Roberts, supra note 46, at 160.
74. Petition for Rehearing for the Advisory Tax Comm'n at 3, Aberdeen Savings
& Loan Assoc. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536 (1930) (No. 22228); see also Roberts,
supra note 46, at 162; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 48, at 7.
75. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 48, at 12. The Washington Tax Investigation
Commission's detailed 76 page report analyzed the tax systems of many other states
and noted that 18 had already "turned to income taxation to supplement the property
tax and to reach escaping tax-paying ability." Id. at 40. The Report made a total of 29
specific recommendations, only two of which related to the proposed new income tax.
Other recommendations suggested changes in methods of property assessment,
restrictions on exemptions, taxation of municipal utilities, increases in governmental
fees for services, and severance and yield taxes on timber and minerals. See generally
id.
76. Roberts, supra note 46, at 182-83.
77. Id. at 183 (quoting veto message by Governor Hartley). Governor Hartley also
stated in his veto message that the Attorney General had advised him that there were
state constitutional infirmities in the income tax measures. Id.
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party and engendered hostility from farming groups.78
The Grange swung into action by launching a statewide
initiative campaign to reenact the income tax measures and by
helping to replace Hartley with an income tax supporter as the
1932 Republican gubernatorial nominee.79 Many of the
Grange's thirty thousand members gathered signatures to put
Initiative 69 on the ballot, and the organization sought and
obtained support from urban based labor groups such as the
Seattle Central Labor Council and the Washington Federation
of Labor.' Education organizations also strongly backed the
initiative because the Depression and falling property values
were endangering property tax based school budgets; the
Washington Education Association, the PTA, and the High
School Teachers' League all lined up behind the ballot proposi-
tion."1 The income tax initiative was also supported by the real
estate industry, which was more interested in the 40-mill limit
initiative on the same ballot.8 2 But the rest of the urban busi-
ness community was firmly opposed to an income tax,
campaigning both directly and through allies in establishment
newspapers." After a highly contentious campaign, the coali-
tion of agriculture, labor, and education interests joined with
disgruntled urban property owners to pass the measure with a
vote of over seventy percent. 4 But just after the State Tax
Commission blanketed the state with forms so that residents
could begin preparing their tax returns,85 the Washington
State Supreme Court handed down its decision in Culliton v.
ChasesI and stopped the income tax dead in its tracks.
III. SHIPS PASSING IN THE NIGHT: CLOSE DECISIONS BUT
LITTLE COMMUNICATION IN CULLITON, STINER,
AND JENSEN
Soon after the voters approved Initiative 69, lawsuits chal-
lenging the measure were brought by two groups of Seattle
78. Id. at 185-89.
79. I&
80. Id. at 194.
81. Roberts, supra note 46, at 189-97.
82. Id. at 194.
83. 1&
84. Results of the 1932 general election (on file with the Office of the Secretary of
State, Olympia, Washington; Washington State Archives, Olympia, Washington).
85. Roberts, supra note 46, at 232-33.
86. 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933).
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businessmen."7 Because of the uncertainty caused by the litiga-
tion and by the recent passage of the 40-mill property tax limit,
the legislature enacted a B&O tax on gross business receipts on
March 9, 1933. The B&O tax was intended to tide the state
treasury over until the legal dispute was resolved and income
tax collections could begin. Although Initiative 69 provided
that the new income tax was to be imposed on 1932 income,
there was no machinery in place for collection. Such a system
could not be developed until well into 1933.9
The challenge to Initiative 69 was argued in Thurston
County before Judge D.F. Wright, who handed down an eight-
een line opinion on April 6, 1933, declaring with scant explana-
tion that "incomes are 'subject to ownership"' and that
Initiative 69's graduated income tax was, therefore, not uni-
form as required by the state constitution.90 The Attorney
General appealed, and because of the need to resolve the mat-
ter quickly so that the state government and residents could
prepare for tax collections in 1934, supreme court arguments
were set for one week later; those arguments were set "so
precipitously," in the words of one lawyer, "as to leave limited
time for the preparation of briefs."' Oral arguments were
held on April 14, 1933, and because of the tight schedule,
numerous briefs and supplemental briefs were submitted in
typewritten form between April 13 and April 19.92 But the
court had been reduced to eight members because of the illness
of Justice Emmett Parker, and it deadlocked.9 3 Instead of
87. Roberts, supra note 46, at 228. These lawsuits were consolidated in the
superior court and on appeal as Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81 (1933).
88. 1933 Wash. Laws 191. Charles Hodde, a Grange organizer for Initiative 69, who
later served as Speaker of the House and then as Chairman of the State Tax
Commission, states that the B&O tax originally was not intended to serve as a
significant source of state government income, but it was passed in the 1933 legislative
session because the adoption of the 40-mill property tax limitation so constrained state
and school funding that an interim tax had to be implemented. Interview with
Charles W. Hodde, Grange organizer for Initiative 69, Olympia, Washington (May 7,
1992) [hereinafter Hodde Interview].
89. 1933 Wash. Laws 101; Hodde Interview, supra note 88; Roberts, supra note 46,
at 224-25, 232-34.
90. Culliton v. Chase, Nos. 14888, 14897 (Thurston Co. Sup. Ct. Mem. Op. Apr. 6,
1933).
91. Respondent McKale's, Inc. Brief at 5, Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d
81 (1933) (No. 24491).
92. See generally Briefs submitted in Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25 P.2d 81
(1933) (No. 24491).
93. Roberts, supra note 46, at 235. See Culliton v. Chase, 173 Wash. 309, 22 P.2d
1049 (1933).
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upholding the lower court's decision on a tie vote, one of the
supreme court justices who supported affirmance of the supe-
rior court's ruling nevertheless agreed to delay the case until
after newly-elected Democratic Governor Clarence D. Martin
appointed a replacement for Justice Parker.95 Over the strenu-
ous objections of Justices Mitchell, Millard, and Steinert, on
June 15, 1933, the court issued an order holding the matter for
reargument.96
In early August, Governor Martin appointed former Spo-
kane Corporate Counsel James M. Geraghty to the Washing-
ton Supreme Court.9 Mr. Geraghty was a Democratic stalwart
and longtime income tax supporter whose appointment was
generally viewed as being directly tied to the Governor's
desired outcome in the income tax litigation.9 It was finally
time for the Washington Supreme Court to rule on Initiative
69's constitutionality.
Briefs in the case, originally typewritten, were revised, and
those of the Attorney General, the plaintiffs, and some of the
amici curiae, were resubmitted in printed form. 9 The Attor-
ney General's brief was short and rather weak; it emphasized
the fact that the tax had been approved by an overwhelming
popular majority.1°° The Attorney General's brief then listed,
without analysis, various state court cases from around the
country that had approved income taxes.101 Lawyers for
Respondent Culliton, who was the owner of a small insurance
agency,10 2 presented a similarly short brief that attempted to
counter the Attorney General's brief point by point.10 3 But the
attorneys retained by the "downtown" business community,
94. That supreme court justice was probably Justice Main. See infra text
accompanying notes 106-07; see also Roberts, supra note 46, at 236 (indicating that it
was either Justice Holcomb or Justice Main).
95. CHARLES H. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLrriCAL HISTORY OF THE
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT 95-96 (1988) [hereinafter SHELDON, CENTURY OF
JUDGING]; Roberts, supra note 46, at 235.
96. SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 95, at 95-96; Roberts, supra note
46, at 235; see also Culliton, 173 Wash. at 309, 22 P.2d at 1049.
97. SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 95, at 96.
98. See id.
99. See, e.g., Brief for the Attorney General, Culliton v. Chase, 173 Wash. 309, 22
P.2d 1049 (1933) (No. 24491); Plaintiff's Brief, Culliton (No. 24491).
100. Brief for the Attorney General, Culliton (No. 24491).
101. Id.
102. Roberts, supra note 46, at 228.
103. Respondent's Brief, Culliton (No. 24491).
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led by Preston, Thorgrimson & Turner,"°4 provided extensive
written arguments that appear to have taken considerable time
and money to prepare. Harold Preston asserted that while a
flat tax would be permissible in Washington, a graduated net
income tax would violate the state constitution's new uniform-
ity provision because "income" was "property" and property
was to be taxed uniformly. Additional typewritten amicus
briefs were submitted by attorneys representing the Grange
and other pro-tax organizations. Several of the amicus briefs
from prominent Seattle law firms were also long and well-
written, but the amicus submittals from small town Initiative
69 supporters remained cursory and in typewritten form.
Eleven briefs in all were presented to the court, and the oral
arguments were held again on August 25, 1933. °5
After hearing oral argument, the court issued its decision
on September 8, 1933, voting five to four to reject the state
income tax."° The lead opinion was written by Justice Oscar
Holcomb and was signed only by him and Justice Main; they
were the two members of the majority who three months ear-
lier had voted to rehear Culliton after the case had deadlocked.
A concurring opinion was filed by Justice Mitchell and signed
by Justice Millard, and Justice William Steinert submitted his
own concurring opinion. A dissenting opinion was issued by
Justice Bruce Blake and signed by Chief Justice Beals and Jus-
tices Tolman and Geraghty.
Justice Holcomb, who drafted the lead opinion, is gener-
ally regarded as the member of the court who had switched
sides between June and September.0 7 Justice Holcomb wrote
that the fact that the income tax had been passed as an initia-
tive was "of no controlling importance"108 and that decisions
from other states lacked significant relevance. 0 9 He asserted
that in Aberdeen Savings & Loan Assn. v. Chase,110 decided
three years earlier, it had "been definitely decided in this state
that an income tax is a property tax, which should set the
104. Roberts, supra note 46, at 229.
105. Id. at 235; Washington State Supreme Court Clerk's files and docket records,
Olympia, Washington.
106. Culliton v. Chase, 173 Wash. 309, 22 P.2d 1049 (1933).
107. SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 95, at 97 n.8; ROBERTS, supmra
note 46, at 236.
108. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 373, 25 P.2d at 82.
109. Id. at 374, 25 P.2d at 82.
110. 157 Wash. 351, 289 P. 536 (1930), reh'g denied, 157 Wash. 391, 290 P. 697 (1930).
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question at rest here."11' He also contended that the "over-
whelming weight of judicial authority is that 'income' is prop-
erty and a tax upon income is a tax upon property.""' 2 Justice
Holcomb's lead opinion cited the language of Article VII, Sec-
tion 1,11 and recited Amendment 14 to the effect that all taxes
must be uniform "upon the same class of property" and that
"[t]he word 'property' as used herein shall mean and include
everything, whether tangible or intangible, subject to owner-
ship. 1 1 4 To him it seemed obvious that income was property
under the state constitution:
It would certainly defy the ingenuity of the most profound
lexicographer to formulate a more comprehensive definition
of "property." It is "everything, whether tangible or intan-
gible, subject to ownership." Income is either property
under [Article VII, Sec. 1], or no one owns it .... There
being no other classification in our constitution but real and
personal property and intangible property, incomes neces-
sarily fall within the category of intangible property. No
more positive, precise and compelling language could have
been used than was used in those words .... It needs no
technical construction to tell what those words mean.1 1 5
Justice Holcomb next held that the net income tax was
not an excise tax because it was not "for licenses to pursue cer-
tain occupations, or upon corporate or business privileges, or
for the manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities."11 6
As a tax on an activity or event rather than on property, an
excise tax would not have been subject to the constitution's
uniformity clause." 7 Justice Holcomb also distinguished the
existing graduated inheritance tax, which the court had previ-
ously approved as not subject to uniformity requirements." 8
Specifically, the opinion said that the tax on inheritances was
111. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 376, 25 P.2d at 83.
112. Id. at 374, 25 P.2d at 82.
113. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1. See source quoted supra text accompanying note
44.
114. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 373, 25 P.2d at 82.
115. Id. at 374, 25 P.2d at 82.
116. Id. at 378, 25 P.2d at 83.
117. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 649, 21 P.2d 721 (1933).
118. In re Ellis' Estate, 169 Wash. 581, 584, 14 P.2d 37, 39 (1932) (stating that "an
inheritance tax is not a tax upon property as such. It is an impost or excise levied as a
condition precedent to the transmission or transfer of property from the dead to the
living"); State v. Clark, 30 Wash. 439, 445, 71 P. 20, 22 (1902) (citing Magoun v. Illinois
Trust and Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288 (1898), for the proposition that "[a]n
inheritance tax is not one on property, but one on the succession").
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"really not a tax at all," but rather "an impost laid but one
time, and not annually" upon devisees who take not by natural
right but rather by sufferance of the state."9 Significantly,
Justice Holcomb also wrote that it "may be possible to frame
an income tax law which will assess all incomes uniformly and
comply with our constitution,"' but that such a law was "not
now before us and we need not consider it."'12
Justice Mitchell's concurring opinion relied almost
entirely on Aberdeen, reiterating that in that corporate income
tax case, the court had decided that income was property, and
that therefore an income tax must be uniform, i.e., flat.'= He
asserted that a small amount of income must be taxed at the
same rate as a large amount of income: "It might be reason-
able.., to provide that, for taxation purposes, horses be put in
a class and bear a rate of taxation different from that of lands
devoted to reforestation; but not so with a band of one thou-
sand horses compared with another band of two thousand hor-
ses . . .123
Justice Steinert's concurrence was similarly veterinary in
character. He noted that the court was "not here concerned
with an act relating to a uniform income tax," but rather "only
with a graduated income tax," and that although "it might not
be unwise, or even unfair, to tax the man who owns ten thou-
sand head of cattle at a rate different from that on which the
owner of a thousand head of cattle is taxed.., the constitution
forbids it."'1 24
Justice Blake's dissent, on the other hand, was intense and
combative. To him it was not obvious, as it had been to Justice
Holcomb, that income was property. Justice Blake focused on
the economic developments and rising property values that had
led both to the 1930 amendment of the state's constitution and
to the 1932 adoption of the 40-mill limit and the income tax. 25
Justice Blake predicted fiscal doom from rejection of the tax
and said that the court should defer to the legislature and the
voters. He wrote that the majority was engaged in "sheer
119. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 378, 25 P.2d at 83.
120. Id. at 379, 25 P.2d at 83.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 380-81, 25 P.2d at 84 (Mitchell, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 382, 25 P.2d at 85.
124. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 383-84, 25 P.2d at 85 (Steinert, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original).
125. Id. at 384-401, 25 P.2d at 86-91 (Blake, J., dissenting).
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sophistry" when it equated income with property.' He
argued, first, that because the income tax was levied on the
individual person, it was an in personam tax, an excise tax
rather than a property tax,2 and second, that if income was
property, the legislature could classify it in various ways so as
to accomplish a graduated income tax.'
Justice Blake's dissenting position was not particularly
thoughtful. It relied primarily on the idea that because the
people had recently passed both an amendment to the uni-
formity clause and an income tax, they must have intended the
constitution to permit that tax.' He did not squarely address
the positions taken in the majority opinion. But then, there
was not very much to address; the majority opinions did not
exhibit much analysis either. Instead they engaged in labeling,
in postulating that income equaled property without discussing
the fundamental nature of either, and in asserting that because
the court had already decided the matter three years earlier in
Aberdeen, it had no reason to revisit the issue. 30 Like ships
passing in the night, each of the two sides in Culliton took a
nonanalytical position and then expounded it without truly
engaging the other side.
The lack of careful analysis by either side of the Culliton
court was underscored by the decision rendered the same day
in State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, l sl a case upholding the B&O tax
the legislature had implemented on an emergency basis until
the income tax went into effect. Stiner was also a five to four
decision, but this time Justice Holcomb rejoined the Culliton
dissenters, colleagues with whom he had voted three months
earlier when that case had been held for reargument. In Sti-
ner, Justice Tolman wrote for the majority that the new gross
business receipts tax was "an excise tax pure and simple.' '1 32
Justice Tolman declined to review the many cases that he said
were relevant to this question, asserting that time and space
would not permit it."s But his argument for the B&O tax
reads as though it could have been another dissenting opinion
126. Id. at 389, 25 P.2d at 87.
127. Id. at 393, 25 P.2d at 88.
128. Id. at 397, 25 P.2d at 90.
129. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 388, 25 P.2d at 87.
130. Id. at 376, 25 P.2d at 83.
131. 174 Wash. 402, 25 P.2d 91 (1933).
132. Id. at 405, 25 P.2d at 93.
133. Id. at 406, 25 P.2d at 93.
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in Culliton if the term "income tax" were substituted for
"B&O tax." Justice Tolman conceded that the constitution
defined property as "anything subject to ownership" and, he
wrote, "in a sense, one's business and its earnings are owned by
him, but the privilege of engaging in business and gainful pur-
suits must and does exist before the business can be estab-
lished."'" He drew from Locke in observing that while "[m]an
in a state of nature gained his sustenance by his strength or
cunning... the established state enacted laws for the protec-
tion of human rights, the rights of property, and to prevent the
weak or the credulous from becoming . . . helpless victims
.... "135 Justice Tolman concluded that because the benefits of
government enabled the businessperson to be "secure in his
property investment, and also in his gains therefrom," this"privilege, far above mere property" was the thing now taxed
so that the beneficiary would pay his "fair share of the cost to
the state of its creation and continuance."' 36 Justice Tolman
then proceeded to the core of his argument, which is hard to
reconcile with the reasoning in Culliton but for the fact that
one justice decided to change sides:
Income may be acquired, but only in exceptional cases, such
as annuities and the like, is it susceptible of ownership.
When acquired, income immediately becomes property in
the hands of the acquirer, and it is, of course, taxable with
other property of the same class.
This act does not concern itself with income which has
been acquired, but only with the privilege of acquiring, and
that the amount of the tax is measured by the amount of the
income in no way affects the purpose of the act or the princi-
ple involved.137
Justice Tolman then stated that he was able to "decisively
determine" that the B&O tax was an "excise tax" and in
accordance with established principles x' 3  and that the legisla-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Stiner, 174 Wash. at 406, 25 P. at 93.
137. Id. at 407, 25 P.2d at 93.
138. Id. Justice Tolman listed the following as authority: Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co v.
Seattle, 172 Wash. 649, 21 P. 721 (1933); Southern Railway Co. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519
(1923); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932); Puget Sound Power &
Light Co. v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 668, 21 P. 727 (1933); Bucoda v. Swaney, 163 Wash. 43,
299 P. 652 (1931); Sumner v. Ward, 126 Wash. 75, 217 P. 502 (1923). Interestingly,
Justice Tolman did not mention Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Spokane Co., 70
Wash. 48, 126 P. 54 (1912), which likewise upheld an excise tax, but included dicta that
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ture could structure excise taxation in virtually any way
absent arbitrary action, fraud, or abuse.'-" Further, the legisla-
ture could impose an excise tax on different types of activities
at different rates, providing various exemptions that made the
B&O tax somewhat "graduated" in character. Discussing
whether a gubernatorial veto of the B&O tax statute's applica-
bility to agriculture and the professions had been arbitrary,
Justice Tolman made some assertions that reflected the great
change in the state's economy over the previous sixty years
and which might cause some smiles today. He stated that an
agricultural exclusion from the tax was proper because
"[f]arming is not a commercial pursuit. It is not a business in
the sense used in this act. By general knowledge and common
consent, farming is classed as a way of life .... .""4 He also
wrote that the exemption of professional and other services
from taxation was reasonable because, while there were "those
who commercialize the professions, the rule to the contrary is
very strict . . .. A profession is not a money getting
business.' 14 1
Justice Steinert responded with a long and biting dissent.
He claimed that the "so-called 'occupation tax' act" was in fact
a non-uniform tax on business income, that Aberdeen had
decided whether any sort of income was property, and that,
therefore, a "tax based upon gross income or gross proceeds of
sales is a property tax."''1 Justice Steinert found the distinc-
tion between "gross income" and "gross proceeds of sales" to
be tenuous, and he also challenged the exemption of farmers
and professionals from taxation. 43 Justice Mitchell signed
Justice Steinert's dissent, and Justices Main and Millard wrote
that they concurred with the main thrust of his argument, but
that they were uncomfortable with the differential treatment
of farmers, doctors, and lawyers.144
Consequently, the state was left with a B&O tax and with-
out an income tax, but skirmishing continued within the court
between two distinct camps: the four-member Culliton minor-
he would not have found supportive. Justice Steinert did cite Spokane & Eastern in
his dissent.
139. Stiner, 174 Wash. at 407-08, 25 P.2d at 93; see infra text accompanying notes
234-238.
140. Stiner, 174 Wash. at 410, 25 P.2d at 94.
141. Id. at 411, 25 P.2d at 95.
142. Id. at 418-20, 25 P.2d at 97-99 (Steinert, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 421-424, 25 P.2d at 98-99.
144. Id. at 424, 25 P.?d at 99 (Main, Millard, J.J., concurring).
[Vol. 16:515
Washington State Income Tax
ity on the one hand, and the Steinert, Mitchell, and Millard
group on the other, with Justices Holcomb and Main as the
swing votes. For example, in State ex rel. Mason County Log-
ging Co. v. Wiley,145 decided in April 1934, the Culliton minor-
ity plus Justices Holcomb and Main upheld a 1931 law taxing
all reforestation lands at the same rate. Challengers had con-
tended that the tax violated the Article VII, Section 1, provi-
sion requiring that such property bear either a severance tax
or an ad valorem levy based on the assessed value of the prop-
erty taxed.' 46 The majority opinion written by Justice Ger-
aghty reflected the continuing debate. He wrote that "[i]t is a
matter of common knowledge that the purpose of the four-
teenth amendment [the 1930 amendment to Article VII] was to
permit a departure from the rigid requirement of uniformity
and equality."'1 47 Because this remedial legislation had been
adopted after "well-considered and deliberate" consideration
by the legislature, he felt "nothing less than a certain and une-
quivocal violation of some constitutional inhibition can warrant
us in holding it inoperative.' 14 Justice Steinert allowed less
deference to the legislature. Joined by Justices Mitchell and
Millard, Justice Steinert replied acidly that the "constitution
is not so elastic or so anaemic that it must bend or bow to the
will or direction of the legislature.' 1 49 Justice Steinert also
replied that the "legislature well knew what was meant by an
ad valorem tax,"'" but that the legislature's "arbitrary
announcement" had "imposed a fictitious and invariable value
upon all lands.' 151
The court's internal conflict over taxation issues was also
reflected in Supply Laundry v. Jenner,152 a follow-up to Stiner
that further challenged B&O tax distinctions among various
professions. Justice Steinert wrote the lead opinion upholding
those distinctions based on Stiner, but his opinion was so
grudging that only Justices Mitchell and Millard joined in it,
causing Justices Main and Justice Justice Tolman to concur
separately. 5 3
145. 177 Wash. 65, 31 P.2d 539 (1934).
146. Id. at 68, 31 P.2d at 541; Respondent's Brief at 27-61 (No. 24601).
147. Wiley, 177 Wash. at 70, 31 P.2d at 542.
148. Id. at 70-71, 31 P.2d at 542.
149. Id. at 77, 31 P.2d at 544 (Steinert, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 78, 31 P.2d at 545.
151. Id. at 81, 31 P.2d at 546.
152. 178 Wash. 72, 34 P.2d 363 (1934).
153. Only five justices signed an opinion in Supply Laundry, presumably because
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While the jousting continued within the court, income tax
advocates set out to overturn Culliton by taking another con-
stitutional amendment to the people in November 19 3 4 .1-1 But
this time, the Grange's coalition with education and urban
labor groups, which has been described as having been on
shaky grounds in the first place," seems to have melted away.
The 40-mill limit passed in 1932 had significantly lowered prop-
erty taxes, and the B&O tax appeared to be providing barely
enough revenue to keep state government and schools operat-
ing.'m The sense of crisis had passed and, without urban sup-
port, the shrinking rural population was insufficient to
reapprove the income tax. In one historian's words, the "coali-
tions among the various interest groups collapsed because eco-
nomic conditions and tax reforms led some to conclude that
the income tax was not as 'necessary' as they originally
believed."' 57
Recognizing that the interim B&O tax measure passed in
1933 would not provide for the total cost of state government
operations over the long term, the next legislature thoroughly
overhauled the tax system with the Revenue Act of 1935,158 a
statute of nearly one hundred-fifty printed pages in which the
B&O tax and inheritance tax were reworked, and in which a
sales tax, compensating use tax, admissions tax, liquor tax, and
nine other new imposts were levied. Despite Governor Mar-
tin's veto of three of the new tax measures, the act established
the basic state tax structure that remains in place today.
The Revenue Act of 1935 also included a corporate net
income tax,159 and a separate statute reenacted the personal
the case was heard by a five-member panel, which was common at that time in order
to handle the court's workload. "Department One," for the period during which
Supply Laundry was handed down, included Justices Main, Mitchell, Millard, and
Steinert. The Chief Justice could sit on either panel or could assign a judge from one
Department to another to provide a five-member panel to hear a case. In Supply
Laundry, the justices hearing the matter consisted of Department One plus Justice
Tolman. For a discussion of the two-department system between 1910 and 1939, see
CHARLES SHELDON, THE WASHINGTON HIGH BENCH: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF THE
STATE SUPREME COURT, 1889-1991, at 49-50 (1992) [hereinafter SHELDON, WASHINGTON
HIGH BENCH].
154. H.J. Res. 12, 23rd Leg., 1933 Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 230.
155. Roberts, supra note 46, at 239.
156. Id. at 253-54.
157. Id. at 14-15.
158. 1935 Wash. Laws 706; see generally, Harsch, Washington Tax System, supra
note 26, 962-64.
159. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 180, §§ 159-84, 1935 Wash. Laws 706.
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net income tax.160 In an attempt to avoid their characterization
as "property taxes," both income tax measures were cast as"privilege" or "excise" taxes. The corporate income tax was
imposed on the "privilege of doing business in [the] state,"'6 1
and the personal net income tax was levied on every resident
"for the privilege of receiving income . ..while enjoying the
protection of [the state's] laws."' 62 The corporate measure
assessed a flat 4% tax,'6 while the personal net income tax
assessed a "normal tax" of 3% on income up to $4,000,'" a"surtax" on income in excess of $4,000,1' and various deduc-
tions and credits that made it still more graduated in nature.
Business interests promptly launched attacks on the key
components of the Revenue Act of 1935. Various lawsuits
focused on the retail sales tax, the use tax, and the personal
and corporate income taxes." Challenges to the retail sales
tax and use tax were argued before the supreme court in the
summer of 1935, and decisions were rendered in August.6 7
Both challenges failed.
In Morrow v. Henneford,'" the court unanimously upheld
the sales tax. In an opinion by Justice Geraghty, the court
ruled that the sales tax was an excise rather than a property
tax, that virtually any type of tax would be upheld unless it
was "prohibited by express language or by necessary implica-
tion in the constitution," and that although merchants were
responsible for collecting the sales tax, their property was not
the actual subject of the levy. 169 Quoting extensively from a
United States Supreme Court opinion upholding a gift transfer
tax,17 Justice Geraghty wrote that although the sales tax was
"imposed upon the exercise of one of the numerous rights of
property, [it] is distinguishable from a tax which falls upon the
owner merely because he is owner, regardless of the use or dis-
160. Personal Net Income Tax Act, ch. 178, 1935 Wash. Laws 660.
161. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 180, § 161, 1935 Wash. Laws 706.
162. Personal Net Income Tax Act, ch. 178, § 2, 1935 Wash. Laws 660.
163. Revenue Act of 1935, ch. 180, §§ 160-61, 1935 Wash. Laws 812-13.
164. Personal Net Income Tax, ch. 178, § 2(a), 1935 Wash. Laws 661-62.
165. Id. § 3.
166. Morrow v. Henneford, 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935); Vancouver Oil Co.
v. Henneford, 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935).
167. Id.
168. 182 Wash. 625, 47 P.2d 1016 (1935).
169. Id. at 627-28, 47 P.2d at 1017 (citing Wiseman v. Phillips, 84 S.W.2d 91, 95-96
(1935)).
170. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
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position made of his property."''
Similarly, in Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henneford,7 2 the court
sustained the "use" or "compensating" tax levied on products
bought outside the state and then imported for use or con-
sumption. Justice Main's majority opinion relied on Morrow to
the effect that the use tax measure was also an excise tax.1 73
Justice Main's opinion held that there was no violation of the
U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause because no tax was col-
lected when another state previously had levied an impost on
the same item.'74 Justices Mitchell, Justice Holcomb, and Mil-
lard dissented on Commerce Clause grounds.
Although the court left standing the sales and use provi-
sions of the Revenue Act of 1935, the personal and corporate
income taxes met less auspicious fates. In January 1936, Jus-
tice Steinert wrote an opinion in Jensen v. Henneford 17 that
not only rejected the personal net income tax, but attempted to
hammer nails into the Culliton coffin. In his brief, the Attor-
ney General had stressed the recent Morrow and Vancouver
Oil cases, quoting language to the effect that a tax on the use
of a piece of property was not a tax on the property itself.176
But Justice Steinert, in an opinion signed by Justices Main,
Mitchell, and Holcomb, reinforced Culliton's labeling of
income as property and stated that "[i]nasmuch as the majority
members of this court, as now constituted, hold the same views
as expressed by them in the Culliton case, it would serve no
useful purpose to enter upon a further discussion of the
authorities considered in that case."'177 Without analysis, Jus-
tice Steinert dismissed Stiner, Supply Laundry, Morrow, and
Vancouver Oil, saying that it was "obvious" that nothing in
any of those cases meant that the court "had receded from its
former emphatic declaration that, under our constitution,
income is property, and that an income tax is a property
tax.""' The opinion went on to dismiss the "privilege" and"excise" language in the new statute as an attempt by the leg-
islature to "change the real nature and purpose of an act by
171. Morrow, 182 Wash. at 631, 47 P.2d at 1019 (citing Bromley, 280 U.S. at 137).
172. 183 Wash. 317, 49 P.2d 14 (1935).
173. Id. at 320-21, 49 P.2d at 16.
174. Id. at 323, 49 P.2d at 17.
175. 185 Wash. 209, 53 P.2d 607 (1936).
176. Appellant's Brief at 21-22, Jensen (Nos. 25854, 25855).
177. Jensen, 185 Wash. at 216, 53 P.2d at 610.
178. Id. at 217, 53 P.2d at 610.
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giving it a different title or by declaring its nature and purpose
to be otherwise."'17 9 But then, Justice Steinert appeared to go
beyond Culliton and, for the first time, offered an explanation
for treating income as property:
The right to receive property (income in this instance) is but
a necessary element of ownership, and, without such right to
receive, the ownership is but an empty thing and of no value
whatever. "In common understanding, to hold property is to
own it. In order to own or hold, one must acquire." Con-
versely, the mere potential privilege of receiving earned
income amounts to nothing unless and until the income is
received. The right to receive, the reception, and the right to
hold, are progressive incidents of ownership and indispensa-
ble thereto. To tax any one of these elements is to tax their
sum total, namely, ownership, and, therefore, the property
(income) itself. 80
Justice Steinert's opinion also held that under the United
States Supreme Court decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co.,' s' a tax on rents from real estate was a tax on the
real estate itself; hence, the income tax on rental income could
not be included in gross income for purposes of income taxa-
tion. 8 2 Justice Millard filed a short concurring opinion, rely-
ing on stare decisis and citing Aberdeen and Culliton. s3
Justice Blake dissented, joined by the Culliton minority.
He queried how the court could permit the "highly discrimina-
tory" taxation of gross income in Stiner without allowing the
"least oppressive" graduated taxation of net income in Jen-
sen."s Justice Blake also argued that the sales tax operated
"directly upon specific, tangible property," while the "tax on
net income operate[d] upon an intangible, inchoate right-sus-
ceptible, indeed, to ownership, but not susceptible to manual
possession.' 8 5 Justice Blake stated, "I am unable to compre-
hend the reasoning which underlies the holding, on the one
hand, that [the sales tax] is not a property tax, and, on the
other hand, that a tax on net income is a property tax."'8 6 Jus-
179. Id
180. Id. at 218-19, 53 P.2d at 611 (citing McFeely v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 296 U.S. 102 (1935)).
181. 157 U.S. 429 (1894).
182. Jensen, 185 Wash. at 222, 53 P.2d at 612.
183. Id. at 225, 53 P.2d at 613 (Millard, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 226, 53 P.2d at 613-14 (Blake, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 227, 53 P.2d at 614.
186. Id.
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tice Blake took the position that the four decisions intervening
since Culliton had caused that case to have "lost its force as
completely as if it had been flatly overruled."'8 7 He was
unable, however, to convince the Culliton majority that this
had occurred, and he had no more success two months later
when a brief opinion in Petroleum Navigation Co. v. Henne-
ford 8 8 reiterated the outcome in Aberdeen and overturned the
corporate income tax provisions of the Revenue Act of 1935.
IV. INCOME EQUALS PROPERTY: How DISCOMFORTING
CONFLICT MADE "EPITHETICAL JURISPRUDENCE"
EASIER THAN REASONED DISCOURSE
When Culliton, Jensen, and Petroleum Navigation are
closely examined together with Aberdeen, it becomes apparent
that a sharply divided court, composed of judges with divergent
philosophies, effectively avoided a reasoned consideration of
the concepts involved in the words "income" and "property."
Instead, the majority opinions resorted to a type of "epithetical
jurisprudence"; that is, a method of legal thinking that
depends on bare labeling, on calling income a form of property,
and then, without much in the way of analysis, reiterating that
axiom like a mantra using stare decisis as a crutch rather than
a tool. 8 9 Apparently, the Washington court was not alone in
approaching income tax cases in this epithetical manner. Wil-
liam J. Matthews, who in 1949 published a detailed and
thoughtful examination of tax uniformity cases from around
the country, observed the following:
ITihe enactment of income tax legislation frequently is the
occasion for sharp political clashes among the various seg-
ments of the community, and the courts are not immune to
these controversies. The constitutionality of many state
income tax statutes has been litigated against a background
of conflicting economic and political interests at a time when
the need for revenue to meet pressing social problems and
the demand for a reallocation of the tax burden were criti-
cal. The courts are not able in every instance to conceal the
influence of this fact on their decisions by drawing nice dis-
tinctions as to the nature of the tax.' 9°
187. Jensen, 185 Wash. at 227, 53 P.2d at 614 (Blake, J., dissenting).
188. 185 Wash. 495, 55 P.2d 495 (1936).
189. See Jensen, 185 Wash. at 217, 53 P.2d at 610.
190. Matthews, supra note 34, at 504.
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Matthews stated that "the opinions in the income tax cases
afford ample opportunity to see the extent to which judicial
thinking on constitutional questions regarding taxation is
dependent on a conceptualistic and analytical method." '191 But
after an extensive review of state income tax cases, he con-
cluded as follows:
As long as the critical features of the statutory scheme are
simple, direct and similar to some familiar tax pattern, it is
possible to solve the basic legal problem . . . by labeling the
tax. But the normal tax statute devised to reach income is
sufficiently complex and different to make judicial analysis
of it unusually difficult if not impossible.192
In his recent state-by-state study of tax uniformity
requirements, Professor Newhouse reached similar conclusions
with respect to Washington:
Though not explicit, the tone of the principal and concurring
opinions for the majority in Culliton hinted at a bitter dis-
pute lying close to the surface, but not yet spilling over into
the printed opinion. That tension is reflected in the defen-
sive tone of the dissenting opinion, and is explicitly con-
firmed in 1936, in the Jensen case, where the acrimonious
debate was not kept in the confines of the conference room
193
Having reviewed the taxation provisions of all fifty states and
studied virtually all of the court opinions relating to uniform-
ity clauses, Newhouse concluded "that none of the several tests
and, often times, bare conclusions offered by the several courts
are convincing as absolute."'" He suggests:
[I]n the final analysis the really decisive questions were:
First, how did the judges look upon an income tax from the
viewpoint of social policy and fiscal policy? Second, how
much discretion was the legislature to be allowed, even
though the tax in question might be distasteful to the judges
on the court?195
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1986.
194. Id. at 2026-27.
195. Id. at 2027; see also id. at 1961-2011, where Newhouse skillfully contrasts
Culliton and some of the state cases decided in the same period that reached a similar
result (e.g., Eliasberg Bros. Mercantile Co. v. Grimes, 86 S. 56 (Ala. 1920); Bachrach v.
Nelson, 182 N.E. 909 (Ill. 1932); Kelley v. Kaloden, 181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935)) with
contemporary cases that reached a contrary result and upheld net income taxes (e.g.,
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From the perspective of social and fiscal policy, how did
Washington's justices look upon the income tax? Justice Ger-
aghty's pro-income tax views were well known when he was
appointed,"9 but most of the justices were prominent members
of the bar for whom neither the "establishment" label nor
party label automatically yields an indication of how they per-
sonally viewed the income tax.197 But the Culliton-Jensen
majority's dependence on labeling in lieu of analysis, and the
minority's emphasis on deference to the people and to the leg-
islature rather than logic, suggests that the justices on both
sides were voting from the heart, or at least from deep-seated
social philosophies.
We can only speculate, but based on the language and the
fervor of Justice Steinert's opinions, it is reasonable to suggest
that he, Millard, and Mitchell, the core of the Culliton-Jensen
majority, fell into a conservative school of economic and legal
thought that for decades had viewed income taxes and other
attempts to separate people from their wealth with extreme
distrust. 198  In a recent study of the Washington Supreme
Court and its justices, Charles Sheldon asserts that the 1930s
court tilted strongly toward the "substantive due process" doc-
trines developed by the United States Supreme Court during
the previous decades."9 Sheldon attempts to show how certain
state and federal constitutional provisions, particularly the due
process and equal protection clauses, were used to provide "a
Stanley v. Gates, 19 S.W.2d 1000 (Ark. 1920); Featherstone v. Norman, 153 S.E. 58 (Ga.
1930); Diefendorf v. Gallet, 10 P.2d 311 (Idaho 1932); Reed v. Bjornson, 253 N.W. 102
(Minn. 1934); State ex rel. Knox v. Gulf, M. & N.R. Co., 104 So. 689 (Miss. 1925);
Hattiesberg Grocery v. Robertson, 88 So. 4 (Miss. 1921); O'Connell v. State Board of
Equalization, 25 P.2d 114 (Mt. 1933)).
196. Roberts, supra note 46, at 235; see also SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra
note 95, at 96.
197. See SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 95, at 90-104, for a discussion
of the processes leading to the appointment of the court that decided Culliton and
Jensen. The Culliton-Jensen majority was composed of three Republicans and two
Democrats, and the minority had just a single Republican; but one should not place too
much stock in partison labels. Justice Mitchell, one of the most conservative court
members, was a Democrat, while Justice Beals was a progressive Republican.
ROBERTS, supra note 46, at 7, found that until 1932 the parties were "virtually
indistinguishable" on state issues. The Republican party was evenly split on the
income tax question, and in 1932 the pro-tax Republicans had prevailed. See supra
note 79 and accompanying text.
198. In his analysis of a variety of decisions over many years, Sheldon has
characterized Justices Mitchell and Steinert as "conservative" and Justice Millard as
"moderate," tending to the conservative end of the spectrum. SHELDON, CENTURY OF
JUDGING, supra note 95, at 275, 283.
199. SHELDON, WASHINGTON HIGH BENCH, supra note 153, at 17.
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conservative court with the.., tools to strike down legislation
threatening private property."' 00 The idea that income taxes
could be misused to destroy property and property rights was
expressed frequently. An earlier example of this perspective
can be found in oral arguments before the United States
Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers' Home & Trust Co., ° a
case upon which Justice Steinert heavily relied. In the Pollock
arguments, which were printed ahead of the Supreme Court's
opinions in the official Supreme Court Reports, and which
were therefore likely read by the members of the Washington
court, one attorney described the federal income tax proposals
'"as communistic, socialistic-what shall I call them-populistic
as ever have been addressed to any political assembly in the
world" and a threat to "one of the fundamental objects of all
civilized government... the preservation of the rights of pri-
vate property."'2 2 In that same case, Justice Field's concurring
opinion described the income tax as a threat "to the very foun-
dation of the government," an "assault upon capital" that "will
become a war of the poor against the rich."2 3
Judge Thomas M. Cooley, whose Treatise on the Law of
Taxation was often quoted in Washington tax case briefs and
opinions, wrote in his 1876 first edition that the theory of
granting income tax exemptions for lower income people
would also justify a heavier proportionate tax on the thrifty
classes in other cases; and the principle once admitted, there
is no reason but its own discretion why the legislature
should stop short of imposing the whole burden of govern-
ment on the few who exhibit most energy, enterprise and
thrift.204
To underscore his disgust for income taxes, Judge Cooley
darkly referred to Gibbon's description of torture used in the
Roman Empire and similar methods of gathering taxes from
Jews in medieval England.20 5 The 1924 edition of Cooley's
treatise, used by advocates in Culliton and Jensen, relegated
Cooley's anti-income tax views to a footnote.2° But Cooley's
200. Id.
201. 157 U.S. 429 (1894), modified, 485 U.S. 523 (1988).
202. Id. at 532, 534 (quoting plaintiff's argument by Joseph H. Choate).
203. Id. at 607 (Field, J., concurring).
204. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION 21 (1876).
205. Id
206. THoMAs M. COOLEY & CLARK A. NICHOLs, THE LAW OF TAXATION 20 n.1 (4th
ed. 1924). Respondent McKale's Inc. quoted this very passage from Cooley in its
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attitude nevertheless continued to be shared by many who
feared that graduated income taxes could lead to confiscation
of substantial amounts of property in a nation they believed
had been founded on the principle of protection of private
property. These beliefs reflected a Lockean thread that ran
though American political thought from before the Revolution.
The Stamp Act had been opposed in America on the grounds
that it violated "natural" rights of property,' and, in 1774,
George Washington wrote that British tax schemes would dis-
possess Americans until they became "tame and abject
slaves."208 An influential contemporary jurist, Nathaniel Chip-
man of Vermont, wrote in 1793 that the right of property was
composed first and foremost of the right to acquire it, and sec-
ond, the right to hold it.' He opposed the equalization of
wealth and believed that government efforts to do so "would
rob the industrious of the fruits of their labor and reward the
indolent."210  James Madison's concept of the Constitution
emphasized the protection of the propertied classes from dis-
possession by the majority, while also protecting that majority
from exploitation.211 Although the rise of industrialism in the
nineteenth century was accompanied by widespread acceptance
of utilitarian political theories that envisaged more govern-
ment intervention in the economy and more controls on pri-
vate property, one commentator has noted that "[n]o group in
the United States [was] more faithful to the philosophy of the
Founding Fathers than the interpreters of their handiwork,
the constitutional lawyers and the judges .... Three of the
best-known treatises on American Law, the Commentaries of
Chancellor Kent (1826-30), those of Justice Story (1833), and
T.M. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (1868) all expound
the same doctrine" '212 that the acquisition as well as the posses-
sion of property are natural rights that must be protected by
law.2 13
With this background in mind, and taking into account
Culliton brief. Respondent McKale's Brief at 40, Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 25
P.2d 81 (1933) (No. 24491).
207. RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 172 n.1.
(1951).
208. Quoted in ScowT, supra note 32, at 37.
209. Id. at 54.
210. Id. at 55.
211. Id. at 45.
212. SCHLATTER, supra note 207, at 194.
213. T.M. Cooley was the same Judge Cooley who expressed such anti-income tax
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business community criticisms that the graduated net income
tax was a burdensome attempt to increase taxes on all and to
extract profits and property from the thrifty,214 it is easy to
comprehend Justice Steinert's views in Jensen and Stiner.
Justice Steinert saw the right to receive and the right to hold
property as one and the same thing in both Jensen211 and in
his indignant dissent in Stiner,2 1 6 the case upholding the B&O
tax. Equally apparent is the countervailing utilitarian view in
Justice Blake's Culliton dissent, in which he emphasized the
plight of agricultural land owners, the state government's fis-
cal predicament, and the need to defer to the public will in
enacting the 1930 uniformity amendment and the 1932 net
income tax.217
Whatever philosophical and political forces influenced the
individual justices' views on the income tax,218 it is clear that
the court was divided by fundamental and irreconcilable differ-
ences. It is also clear that the terms "property" and "income"
were difficult for the justices to define, and that it was much
more convenient to look for an easy way out. Justice
Holcomb's lead opinion in Culliton provided that easy way by
concluding that the issue had already been decided. Except for
Justice Steinert's short argument in Jensen that the right to
acquire and the right to hold income are both attributes of
property, the majority decisions in Culliton, Jensen, and Petro-
leum Navigation all avoided a serious analysis of what consti-
tutes property and income. Instead, they claimed that
Aberdeen had held that an income tax was a property tax, that
the "overwhelming weight of judicial authority is that 'income'
is property," and, in Justice Holcomb's words, that "should set
views in his TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION. See generally COOLEY, supra note
204.
214. Roberts, supra note 46, at 183-84, 200-02.
215. Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 219, 53 P.2d 607, 611 (1936).
216. State ex rel. Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 419-20, 25 P.2d 91, 98-99 (1933)
(Steinert, J., dissenting).
217. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 384-88, 25 P.2d 81, 86-91 (1933).
218. Former Grange organizer, legislator, and tax commissioner Charles Hodde is
firmly of the view that the decisive factor in Culliton's outcome was the fact that while
the supreme court had that case under advisement, the state insisted on sending out
tax return forms to every household, including thousands of people whose incomes
were so low they were not subject to tax. Tax return forms were of course mailed to
each of the justices. Hodde believes that the public confusion over the forms, which
were viewed as rather complicated, caused Justice Holcomb to desert his former pro-
tax position. Hodde Interview, supra note 88. However, as Roberts points out, this is
in the realm of "folklore" rather than history. Roberts, supra note 46, at 234.
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the question at rest. 2 1 9
But Aberdeen did not decide that income was a form of
property, at least not under the Washington Constitution, and
the position taken by the supreme court in Culliton did not,
even in 1933, reflect the prevailing judicial view nationwide.
Aberdeen and its companion cases' were brought by savings
and loan associations for several reasons. First, the cases chal-
lenged the large difference between the corporate income tax
the savings and loans were to pay and that to be paid by com-
mercial banks.22 Second, they attacked the legislature's fail-
ure to impose a similar tax on investment banking firms that
were not corporations.222 And third, they were brought to
block the attempted taxation of interest income from federal
securities.223 In Aberdeen, the plaintiffs-appellants' briefs
raised the issue of the character of the tax to argue that it was
not an excise tax, because then, as now, legislatures were
granted substantially more discretion to distinguish among
industries and forms of business organization in applying such
taxes.224 The primary thrust of the savings and loans' chal-
lenge was that under the United States Supreme Court ruling
in Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,25 the differential
treatment of corporate and non-corporate businesses violated
the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. The plain-
tiffs-appellants also argued that MacAllen Co. v. Massachu-
setts226 prohibited state taxation of federal bond interest.2
27
The briefs in Aberdeen and the related cases were very
long by the standards of the day, but the issue of whether the
proposed tax violated the state constitution's then-existing uni-
formity provision appears to have been raised as an after-
thought; only ten pages of appellant Aberdeen Savings & Loan
Association's one hundred seventy-four page opening brief was
219. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 374, 376, 25 P.2d at 82-83.
220. Burr, Conrad & Broom, Inc. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 393, 289 P. 551 (1930); In re
Washington Mutual Savings Bank, 157 Wash. 698, 289 P. 555 (1930); United Diversified
Securities Corp. v. Chase, 157 Wash. 699, 289 P. 554 (1930).
221. Aberdeen Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Chase, 157 Wash. 351, 360-61, 289 P. 536,
541 (1930), reh'g denied, 157 Wash. 391, 290 P. 697 (1930).
222. Burr, 157 Wash. at 394-95, 289 P. at 552.
223. Aberdeen, 157 Wash. at 365, 289 P. at 543.
224. Id. at 360-61, 289 P. at 541.
225. 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
226. 279 U.S. 620 (1929).
227. Aberdeen, 157 Wash. at 365-67, 289 P. at 543.
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devoted to the issue,228 the Attorney General dedicated just
three of his two hundred six pages to the same question,2 and
the appellant's one hundred thirty-five page reply brief spent
just one and one-half pages on the matter.2 s The appellants in
Burr, Conrad & Broom, Inc. v. Chase used just four of their
ninety-four pages to discuss the uniformity question.2' In
their discourse on the state constitutional issue, the appellants'
briefs relied mainly on Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & TrustCo. ,232 the United States Supreme Court decision nullifying the
1894 federal income tax on grounds that it was a direct rather
than an indirect levy.233 But rather than discussing the charac-
ter of income as property, the appellant's arguments followed
Pollock and concentrated on whether the tax in question was
direct or indirect and whether it was an authentic corporate
privilege tax.23 4
In his majority opinion striking down the proposed corpo-
rate tax in Aberdeen, Justice Beals relied on the United States
Supreme Court's equal protection holding in Quaker City Cab
Co. 235 and the MacAllen bar to taxing income from federal
securities.2 36 Although he noted in a side comment that the
Attorney General did "not seriously contend that a tax of like
general nature to that which we are now considering can be
lawfully levied directly upon appellants' property, which is
equivalent to the levy of such a tax upon.., net income," 237 he
never discussed the issue of whether an income tax was
228. Appellant Aberdeen Savings & Loan Association's Opening Brief at 161-70,
Aberdeen (No. 22228).
229. Respondent Attorney General's Brief at 156-59, Aberdeen (No. 22228).
230. Appellant Aberdeen Savings & Loan Association's Reply Brief at 126-27,
Aberdeen (No. 22228).
231. Appellant Burr, Conrad & Broom's Brief at 87-90, Aberdeen (No. 22228).
232. 157 U.S. 429 (1894).
233. Appellant Aberdeen Savings & Loan Association's Opening Brief at 165-68,
Aberdeen (No. 22228); Appellant Burr, Conrad & Broom's Opening Brief at 87,
Aberdeen (No. 22228). Article I, § 9, of the U.S. Constitution includes a requirement
that "direct" taxes be apportioned among the states based on population, while Article
I, § 8, permits Congress to impose "duties, imposts and excises" uniformly throughout
the United States. Until Pollock, "direct taxes" had been limited to capitation taxes
and taxes on real estate. Pollock's characterization of the income tax as a direct tax
made it impracticable: Some states might have relatively fewer but richer people,
while others might have a large, poor population, so that apportionment of the tax on
a population bases among the states would not work. See NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at
1935.
234. See Aberdeen, 157 Wash. at 361, 289 P. at 541.
235. Id. at 364, 374, 289 P. at 542, 545.
236. Id. at 365-69, 289 P. at 543-44.
237. Id. at 361, 289 P. at 541.
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equivalent to a property tax. Indeed, Justice Beals rendered
the court's decision assuming that the proposed levy was a tax
on the privilege to engage in business, but held that "in the
carrying on of which [business] every person is entitled to the
equal protection of the laws in accordance with the mandate of
the Federal constitution."' Justice Beals, who later voted
with the Culliton minority to uphold the state income tax,2"
expressly stated in Aberdeen that the court's decision being
based on the U.S. Constitution "render[ed] unnecessary any
discussion of appellants' contention that the act... violates the
uniform taxation provisions of the constitution of the state of
Washington."'
Respondents and attorneys for the Advisory Tax Commis-
sion of Washington, as amici curiae, filed petitions for rehear-
ing of Aberdeen and its companion cases. The amici curiae
argued, in the court's words, that language used in the Aber-
deen and associated opinions
indicate[d] that the court intended to lay down certain prin-
ciples of constitutional law which affect other existing laws
providing for the raising of revenue, and which may be con-
strued as limiting the power of the state legislature in enact-
ing future legislation providing for ... other and different
species of taxes.24 1
The Advisory Tax Commission, the broad based "blue ribbon"
committee established by the 1929 legislature to undertake a
comprehensive review of Washington's tax structure,2 42
pleaded that the Aberdeen decision appeared to preempt the
Commission's own review because the case would be read as
authority for the following propositions: (1) the question of
whether the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution
was violated would depend on whether the tax was a property
tax or an excise tax; (2) a net income tax was a property tax
under the U.S. Constitution; (3) a gross receipts tax was not
distinguishable from an income tax and is a property tax; and
(4) an excise tax in Washington would be limited to a tax on
the exercise of the corporate franchise.243 The Commission
238. Id. at 365, 289 P. at 542.
239. See supra text accompanying note 106.
240. Aberdeen, 157 Wash. at 374, 289 P. at 545.
241. Id. at 391, 290 P. at 697-98.
242. See supra notes 73-75 and acccompanying text.
243. Petition for Rehearing of Arthur G. Cohen and Lester M. Livengood as
Amici Curiae on Behalf of the Advisory Tax Commission of Washington, July 10, 1930,
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also argued that the question of whether the proposed corpo-
rate tax was a property tax, an income tax, or an excise tax"was not a necessary or proper issue in determining whether
the tax contravened the Equal Protection Clause. '
In denying the petitions for rehearing, the court expressly
ruled per curmam that "the [court's] opinions above cited were
rendered with a view to determining the questions presented
by the cases at bar, and those questions only."'" The court
also ruled that the levy under consideration would be treated,"under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States," as a property rather than an excise or corporate
franchise tax for the purpose of holding that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause would not permit its being levied differently on
corporations, partnerships, and individuals.' Both in the
main Aberdeen opinion and in the opinion denying the peti-
tions for rehearing, the court took pains to emphasize that it
was issuing limited rulings based on the U.S. Constitution and
was not ruling on the character of the corporate tax under
Washington's constitution. 7
Thus, the majority opinions in Culliton and Jensen were
founded on the mistaken, or perhaps disingenuous, proposition
that the Aberdeen court had considered and settled the ques-
tion of whether income constituted a form of property under
Article VII of the Washington State Constitution.248 Once
Aberdeen was misread into Culliton, it was easy for the error
to be repeated, to be enshrined in Jensen, and then to be com-
pounded whenever something approaching an income tax was
attempted by the legislature.249 One of the peculiarities of this
misuse of Aberdeen is the fact that Justice Holcomb, who in his
at 7, Aberdeen (No. 22228) [hereinafter Petition of Advisory Tax Commission]. The
Attorney General, representing the separate State Tax Commission, also petitioned for
rehearing on the grounds that the court's ruling would make it "impossible for the
legislature to write a tax upon corporate franchises measured by income of any
character which the court would not hold to be a property tax." Id. at 2.
244. Petition of Advisory Tax Commission at 9, Aberdeen (No. 22228).
245. Aberdeen, 157 Wash. at 392, 290 P. at 697.
246. Id.
247. Aberdeen, 157 Wash. at 374, 289 P. at 545; 157 Wash. at 392, 290 P. at 697.
248. It must be noted that the version of Article VII in effect when Aberdeen was
decided in June 1930, was the stricter version replaced later that year by the voters.
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., Power Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 196, 235 P.2d 173, 177 (1951),
in which a corporate franchise tax was labeled "a mere property tax 'masquerading as
an excise"' and was rejected based on Culliton and Aberdeen without reviewing the
underlying theory in those cases.
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Culliton opinion had relied so heavily on Aberdeen, filed a
strong dissent in Aberdeen, arguing that the Aberdeen major-
ity misconstrued the United States Supreme Court equal pro-
tection cases upon which Aberdeen was based.' In addition to
Aberdeen being a weak leg upon which to rest any decision
that income is a form of property, the United States Supreme
Court cases that provided the other legs upon which Aberdeen,
Culliton, and Jensen rested have since been overruled. Quaker
City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,"' which had prohibited different
treatment of corporations and non-corporations for tax pur-
poses, was overturned in 1973 as "a relic of a bygone era.'252
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,m3 which in 1894 had cat-
egorized the federal income tax as a "direct tax," was rendered
ineffective by the 1913 enactment of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment and was further weakened by the 1915 case of Brushaber
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,' which held as follows:
[Tihe conclusion reached in the Pollock case did not in any
degree involve holding that income taxes generically and
necessarily came within the class of direct taxes on property,
but on the contrary recognized the fact that taxation on
income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as
such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it
would amount to accomplishing the result which the
requirement as to apportionment of direct taxation was
adopted to prevent .... 2m
The remainder of Brushaber was overruled in 1988, 5  and
MacAllen has been a dead letter since 1983.57
In addition to incorrectly stating Aberdeen's holding on
income as a form of property, Justice Holcomb's opinion in
Culliton also mistakenly represented that the "overwhelming
weight of judicial authority" supported that view.25 New-
250. Aberdeen, 157 Wash. at 374-75, 289 P. at 546 (Holcomb, J., dissenting).
Specifically, in his Aberdeen dissent, Holcomb argued that a substantial difference
between the way partnerships, individuals, and corporations carried on financial
enterprises provided ample justification for treating them differently for corporate
franchise tax purposes.
251. 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
252. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 365 (1973).
253. 157 U.S. 429 (1894).
254. 240 U.S. 1 (1915).
255. Id. at 16-17.
256. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 522 (1988).
257. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983); see also South
Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 526 (1988).
258. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 374, 25 P.2d 81, 82 (1933).
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house's study shows that throughout this period the position
that income was not a form of property was consistently in the
majority, and that majority has since grown.2- 9 He states the
following:
Overall, for all the bitter controversy of the 1920's and the
1930's, in the end there were only five state courts which
actually ruled negatively on income taxes under the uni-
formity limitations, with that negative position either aban-
doned or modified in three of them, leaving only two state
courts seemingly standing by their strict uniformity inter-
pretations with respect to income taxes: Washington and
Pennsylvania.2 °
As discussed below, Pennsylvania's constitutional provi-
sion is stricter than Washington's provision.26 1 And despite
Justice Holcomb's assertion that Washington's uniformity
clause language was idiosyncratic and that other states' inter-
pretations of their uniformity provisions were not useful,6 2
Washington was not, and is not, alone among the states with a
uniformity provision requiring taxes to be "uniform upon the
same class of property. '26 3 Newhouse reports that, by 1937,
this type of language, which he classifies as a Type XII clause,
was found in the constitutions of seven states,26 and the Wash-
ington uniformity provision's definition of property is rather
close to language ordinarily found in the dictionary.2a
What is important, however, is not so much that a number
of states had similar constitutional terms, or that Washington
is one of only two states that still classifies income as property.
What is important is the reasoning of many courts, including
the United States Supreme Court, which rejects the notion
that income is a static asset and is therefore property. Because
Culliton and Jensen were dependent on a misstatement of the
holding in Aberdeen, and because the United States Supreme
Court cases upon which Aberdeen relied have been overturned,
any future consideration of the nature of a Washington net
income tax must be based on reasoned argument rather than
the recitation of a mantra to the effect that "income equals
259. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 2019-21.
260. Id. at 2021.
261. See irfra notes 321-22 and accompanying text.
262. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 374, 25 P.2d at 82.
263. Id. at 371, 25 P.2d at 81 (citing WASH. CONST. amend. XIV).
264. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1720.
265. See infra note 268.
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property."266
V. THE INCOME TAx As Sui GENERIS
The most sensible view of income, one taken by a number
of state courts before and after Culliton, adopted by the United
States Supreme Court later in the 1930s, and alluded to in Jus-
tice Tolman's Stiner opinion upholding the B&O tax,2 67 is that
"income" denotes something in action, something "coming in"
to a person but not yet arrived. Conversely, "property" means
a static asset that has already arrived and is in a person's pos-
session.268 Thus, a property tax is a periodic tax on stationary
wealth held at the time of assessment, and it may include a tax
on money if that money is retained as an asset. In contrast, an
income tax is levied against funds that flow to the person
taxed, and, like an inheritance tax,269 it is levied against each
266. A fresh consideration of the nature of a net income tax under the current
Washington State Constitution would almost certainly be provoked by legislative
adoption of such a tax. An alternate, though unlikely, approach would be for the
Governor to attempt to carry out the provisions of the 1935 personal net income tax,
which has never been repealed. Even the 1932 income tax approved by the voters was
never expressly repealed, although a blanket repealer in the Revenue Act of 1935 may
have revoked at least part of it. 1935 Wash. Laws 178, § 71, states that "[a]ll acts and
parts of acts in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed." The 1935
corporate income tax, 1935 Wash. Laws 180, §§ 159-84, was repealed when the
legislature attempted to put a corporate income tax into effect in 1951. 1951 Wash.
Laws 10, 1st Ex. Sess., §§ 3-45. While the 1951 graduated corporate income tax was
ruled unconstitutional in Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash. 2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951),
the enabling statute itself has never been repealed.
267. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
268. The term income is defined in part by WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1143 (Unabridged 1971), as follows: "1. archaic- an act or an instance of
coming in: Entrance, Advent, Influx ... 3: something that comes in as an increment
or addition usu. by chance 4a: a gain or recurrent benefit that is usu. measured in
money and for a given period of time .... b: the value of goods and services received
by an individual in a given period of time...." Further, ERIC PARTRIDGE, ORIGINS: A
SHORT ETYMOLOGIcAL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH 111 (1959), notes that the
term income is derived from the Old English incumen, "to income," i.e., to come in.
In contrast with the active nature of income, the term property has traditionally
meant something that is already held or possessed. For example, WEBSTER'S, supra at
1818, defines property as "2 a: something that is or may be owned or possessed... b:
the exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose of a thing ... " The term property
comes from the Latin word proprietas, which connotes ownership or right of
possession and which in turn is derived from the Latin word proprius, meaning
"[o]ne's own absolutely or in perpetuity," "held apart," "special." OXFORD LATIN
DICTIONARY 1495 (1982); JOSEPH T. SHIPLEY, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH WORDS 307
(1984); HARPER'S LATIN DICTIONARY 1472 (1898).
269. As Justice Blake made clear in his Culliton dissent, there are logical
difficulties in placing an inheritance tax on property passed on from generation to
generation in the "excise" category, while placing a tax levied once on income earned
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dollar only once because that money might not be retained.
Justice Steinert asserted in Jensen that "the mere poten-
tial privilege of receiving earned income amounts to nothing
unless and until the income is received," and he equated the
"right to receive, the reception, and the right to hold" property
as one and the same thing.27 It is correct to say that there is a
relationship between income and assets, and Justice Steinert
intuitively sensed that connection. Indeed, economists,
accountants, and tax assessors all recognize that potential
income streams can be capitalized in the value of property and
that, conversely, the value of an individual's property is at least
in part a reflection of its income-producing potential. But the
fact that income can be created by property does not mean that
income is property any more than the fact that income can be
created by labor means that income is labor. The term prop-
erty connotes a person's relationship to certain objects, a recog-
nized right to use those objects; property also connotes those
objects themselves as they stand in relation to a person, for
example: "the bed is my property," and "the money in the
mattress is my property." But income is not an object; income
connotes movement, the movement of money or other things
of value coming to a person. From an economist's standpoint,
"[t]he concept of income is meaningless unless a time period is
specified. Income is a flow over time and will vary in amount
with the time period chosen."'" Income is not property, and,
when viewed correctly, an income tax could be characterized
as an excise tax or as a tax in a class by itself, but an income
tax is certainly not a property tax.
An early recognition of the distinction between income
and property is found in Waring v. Savannah,2 which was
cited but not discussed in the Culliton and Jensen briefs.
Rejecting the idea that income was a form of property, the
Georgia State Supreme Court in that 1878 case held as follows:
[A]re gross earnings and interest, coming in from any source,
labor, capital .... money loaned--are these things property
in the sense of the constitution, and to be taxed as real, gen-
uine property-such as real estate and personal effects,-or
during the year in the "property tax" category. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 390,
25 P.2d 81, 87 (1933) (Blake, J., dissenting).
270. Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 218-19, 53 P.2d 607, 611 (1936).
271. DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF
THEORY TO PRACTICE 455 (3d ed. 1990).
272. 60 Ga. 93 (1878).
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are these really income? Certainly the gross earnings of a
laboring man are nothing but his income; so, it would seem,
the earnings of a salaried officer are income; and, so, the
income from capital employed in a bank, or railroad, or man-
ufactory, would seem to be income only. The net income,
after expenses are paid, becomes property when invested, or
if it be money lying in a bank, or locked up at home. But, to
call it property when it is all consumed as fast as it arises-
going on the back, or in the stomach, or in carriages and hor-
ses (which are taxed), or in travel and frolic-to call such
income, so used, property, would seem a perversion of terms.
The fact is property is a tree; income is the fruit; labor is
a tree; income, the fruit; capital, the tree; income the fruit.
The fruit, if not consumed as fast as it ripens, will germinate
from the seed which it encloses, and will produce other
trees, and grow into more property; but so long as it is fruit
merely, and plucked to eat, and consumed in the eating, it is
no tree, and will produce itself no fruit.2 3
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court similarly held
in 1927 that "[i]ncome is something derived from property,
labor, skill, ingenuity or sound judgment, or from two or more
in combination. It is not commonly thought of as property but
as gain derived from property .... .,I These and similar hold-
ings were brought to the attention of Washington readers in a
short but tightly reasoned 1931 article by Alfred Harsch, who
reversed the Georgia court's tree-and-fruit metaphor to demon-
strate the weakness in equating property with income:
[A 1920 Alabama] decision seems to be based . . . upon the
following bit of syllogistic reasoning:
"To summarize: Money or any other thing of value,
acquired as gain or profit from capital or labor, is
property; in the aggregate, these acquisitions consti-
tute income; and in accordance with the axiom that
the whole includes all of its parts, income includes
property and nothing but property, and therefore is
itself property."
273. Id. at 99-100 (emphasis in original).
274. Stony Brook R. Corp. v. Boston & M.R.R. Co., 157 N.E. 607, 610 (1927).
Standard accounting principles also make a basic distinction between income, which is
measured over time and reflected on an income statement, and assets, which are
measured at one point in time and described on a balance sheet. Income only appears
on the balance sheet to the extent that it is not spent or distributed, and it is then
treated as "retained earnings" or "changes in capital." HENRY SELLIN, ATTORNEY'S
HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING § 1.02, at 1-5 to 1-20 (3d ed. 1991).
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An analysis of this bit of deductive logic reveals that
there are in the major and minor premise no common fac-
tors. In the major premise that which is declared equivalent
to property is a thing in esse, tangible things cfter their
acquisition. In the minor premise that which is income is an
act-acquiring. The act of acquiring and the thing acquired
are called synonymous. The fallacy of the reasoning
employed is best illustrated by paraphrasing. First: Apples
and pears picked from trees are fruit. Second: The picking
of apples and pears from trees constitutes labor.
Therefore, fruit is labor. 75
Harsch's article was not cited in any of the pro-income tax
briefs in Culliton, and his logic was neither addressed nor
refuted in any of the majority opinions striking down Washing-
ton income taxes. Justice Tolman's Stiner opinion sustaining
the B&O tax alluded to this approach when he wrote that
"[i]ncome may be acquired, but only in exceptional cases... is
it susceptible of ownership. When acquired, income immedi-
ately becomes property in the hands of the acquirer, and it is,
of course, taxable with other property of the same class." 76
But the Culliton majority refused to apply this rationale when
given the opportunity two years later in Jensen. The serious
analysis of the nature of income and property contained in the
cases cited by Harsch, and referred to in the briefs of the
Attorney General and various amici curiae, was shrugged off
as inapplicable because of the "peculiarly forceful" nature of
Washington's uniformity provision. 7 7  As noted above, the
court found it easier to assert that the issue had been previ-
ously settled in Aberdeen.
In addition to the states whose court decisions directly
addressed the income-as-property issue, and which were avail-
able to the Washington court in 1933 and 1935,18 several other
states subsequently approved income taxes.279 The most
275. Alfred E. Harsch, State Income Taxation as Affected by Property Tax
Limitations, 6 WASH. L. REV. 97, 101 (1931).
276. State ex rel Stiner v. Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 407, 25 P.2d 91, 93 (1933).
277. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 374, 25 P.2d at 82. As stated supra in the text
accompanying note 264, several states had constitutional provisions quite similar to
Washington's. Justice Holcomb also seemed to place great stock in what he thought
was a peculiar definition of property in Article VII, Section 1. But the constitutional
definition is rather common and has nothing unique about it. See, e.g., supra note 268.
278. See generally cases cited in NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1923-78.
279. See, e.g., State ex rel. California Co. v. State of Colorado, 348 P.2d 382 (Colo.
1959), dismissed, 364 U.S. 285 (1960); Thorpe v. Mahin, 250 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. 1969); Vilas
v. Iowa State Bd. of Assessment and Review, 273 N.W. 338 (Iowa 1937); Reynolds
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important of these post-Culliton cases is Thorpe v. Mahin. °
Thorpe overruled Bachrach v. Nelson,"' a 1932 Pollock-based
case upon which anti-income tax briefs in Washington had
placed great reliance. 2  In Thorpe, the Illinois Supreme Court
found that it had incorrectly been led to believe earlier that
the "'overwhelming weight of judicial authority' holds that an
income tax is a property tax.''2 3  Accordingly, the court
adopted the United States Supreme Court's reasoning in the
1936 case of New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves' and held that
income was not a form of property.' Graves involved
whether a state had the authority to tax the income received
by its residents from land or mortgages outside its borders. In
approving such taxation, Justice Stone wrote that a tax
apportioned to the ability of the taxpayer to pay it, is
founded upon the protection afforded by the state to the
recipient of the income in his person, in his right to receive
the income and in his enjoyment of it when received. These
are rights and privileges which attach to domicile within the
state. To them and to the equitable distribution of the tax
burden, the economic advantage realized by the receipt of
income and represented by the power to control it, bears a
direct relationship ....
Neither the privilege nor the burden is affected by the
character of the source from which the income is derived.
For that reason income is not necessarily clothed with the
tax immunity enjoyed by its source.
Neither analysis of [various] types of taxes, nor consider-
ation of the bases upon which the power to impose them
rests, supports the contention that a tax on income is a tax
on the land which produces it. The incidence of a tax on
income differs from that of a tax on property. Neither tax is
dependent upon the possession by the taxpayer of the sub-
Metals Co. v. Martin, 108 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1937); Opinion of the Justices, 178 N.E. 621
(Me. 1935); Haggert v. Nichols, 265 N.W. 859 (N.D. 1936); Oursler v. Towes, 13 A.2d 763
(Md. App. 1940).
280. 250 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. 1969).
281. 182 N.E. 909 (Ill. 1932).
282. See, e.g., Respondent Culliton's Brief at 7-10, Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363,
25 P.2d 81 (1933) (No. 24491), and the amicus brief submitted by the law firm of Allen,
Froude et al. at 9, Culliton (No. 24491), which quotes Bachrach's assertion that the
"overwhelming weight of judicial authority holds" that income is a form of property.
Bachrach, 182 N.E. at 914. Bachrach was the likely source of Justice Holcomb's
mistaken impression that he was following the nationwide majority view.
283. Thorpe, 250 N.E.2d at 635-38.
284. 300 U.S. 308 (1936).
285. Thorpe, 250 N.E.2d at 635-36.
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ject of the other. His income may be taxed, although he
owns no property, and his property may be taxed although it
produces no income. The two taxes are measured by differ-
ent standards, the one by the amount of income received
over a period of time, the other by the value of the property
at a particular date. Income is taxed but once; the same
property may be taxed recurrently. The tax on each is pred-
icated upon different governmental benefits .... 286
The following year in Hale v. State Bd. of Assessment and
Review," the United States Supreme Court upheld Iowa's
inclusion of state and local bond interest in income for tax pur-
poses. In Hale, Justice Cardozo's opinion noted that "the ques-
tion as to the nature of [the income] tax has come up
repeatedly under state constitutions requiring taxes upon prop-
erty to be equal and uniform, or imposing similar restrictions.
Many, perhaps most, courts hold that a net income tax is to be
classified as an excise. '  In upholding the Iowa court's rul-
ing, Justice Cardozo wrote that "even more conclusively, deci-
sions of our own court forbid us to stigmatize as unreasonable
the classification of a tax upon net income as something differ-
ent from a property tax, if not substantially an excise. '2 9 Jus-
tice Cardozo then proceeded to discuss in detail three previous
cases in which the United States Supreme Court treated
income taxes and property taxes as different species: New
York ex rel. Clyde v. Gilchrist,29° New York ex rel. Cohn v.
Graves,291 and Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.
292
Justice Cardozo's description of an income tax as some-
thing different from a property tax, while not quite an excise
tax, gives us a hint as to why the contemporary Culliton court
had trouble dealing with the income and property definitions.
The confusion and difficulty may well have resulted from both
lawyers and judges, in their briefs and opinions, attempting to
force the income tax into a convenient and familiar niche.
Many people, following Cooley's popular treatise on taxa-
tion,29 a saw taxes as neatly divisible into three familiar classes:
286. Graves, 300 U.S. at 308, 313-14.
287. 302 U.S. 95 (1937).
288. Id. at 104.
289. Id. at 106.
290. 262 U.S. 94 (1923).
291. 300 U.S. 308 (1936).
292. 240 U.S. 1 (1915).
293. COOLEY, supra note 204, § 38, at 118.
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capitation taxes (also known as "poll" or "head" taxes), prop-
erty taxes, and excise taxes.' Although the Cooley treatise
itself had difficulty deciding which class an income tax would
fit into, 95 lawyers on both sides in Culliton believed it was
important to demonstrate that the income tax had to be cub-
byholed as either a property tax or an excise tax. The pro-
income tax attorneys argued that it was an excise tax, thus
facilitating application of the established doctrine granting the
legislature great leeway in making distinctions between types
of persons subject to, and the rates of, excise taxes.Y9" Their
opponents struggled to put the measure into the "property
tax" box, thus bringing the constitution's uniformity require-
ments into play. In his opinion, Justice Holcomb felt it neces-
sary to quote from Cooley to the effect that excise taxes were
"[t]axes laid upon the manufacture, sale, or consumption of
commodities ... [and] upon licenses ... and upon corporate
privileges." 297 He concluded that the "taxes here in question
can in no sense be said to be for licenses to pursue certain
occupations, or upon corporate or business privileges, or for the
manufacture, sale or consumption of commodities within the
state."" 8  Because the classification of taxes had been deemed
so important, and because the Culliton court had rejected one
form of net income tax as a non-uniform property tax, the
Washington State Legislature unsuccessfully attempted to
reenact an income tax two years later by declaring it to be, and
structuring it as, an excise or "privilege" tax.299
This insistence on labeling, and using the most familiar
epithets at that, hindered clear thinking. Professor Robert C.
294. Poll taxes were a basic source of local government revenue in Washington
until 1893, when the county poll tax was omitted from the state's revenue law. 1893
Wash. Laws CXXIV 323. A road poll tax was repealed by 1907 Wash. Laws 246, §§ 3,
680, and a reenacted poll tax for financing state and county government, 1921 Wash.
Laws 174, at 674, was halted by a 1922 initiative, 1923 Wash. Laws 1. The property tax
was the primary source of state government revenue until the 40-mill limit was
enacted, at which point the property tax was turned over to finance schools and local
government needs. The inheritance tax appeared in 1901, and several minor excise
taxes such as the automobile license tax and a gas tax were implemented in the early
1900s. Hence, all three of these basic classes of taxes were familiar to public officials in
Washington. See Harsch, Washington Tax System, supra note 26, at 952-54; and STATE
OF WASHINGTON, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: REPORT OF THE TAX
ADVISORY COUNCIL 99 et seq. (1958).
295. COOLEY, supra note 204, § 49, at 138-41.
296. See supra note 99 and infra notes 306-13 and accompanying text.
297. Culliton, 174 Wash. at 377, 25 P.2d at 83.
298. Id. at 378, 25 P.2d at 83; see also Hestnes, supra note 25, at 82.
299. 1935 Wash. Laws 661-62; 1935 Wash. Laws 813.
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Brown suggested that "perhaps the simple statement that [the
income tax] is a tax upon an act will do as well as any. Follow-
ing this theory, an income tax might well be regarded as an
excise upon the act of earning or receiving the income. ' '3 00 But
Professor Brown put forward an alternate analysis that, had it
been adopted by Washington's court, would have enabled the
justices to consider the income tax on its own legal merits. He
urged that the income tax be treated as sui generis, in a class
by itself.30' This approach, alluded to in a 1925 Arkansas deci-
302 1 0sion, and fully adopted in Indiana303 and Minnesota3°  in
1934, makes it easier to determine that an income tax is not a
property tax because it does not need to be fit into an alternate"'excise" category. There is no inherent reason why any tax
should have to fit into one niche or another. The power of tax-
ation, regardless of the nature of an impost, is, as the United
States Supreme Court has held, "the most plenary of sovereign
powers,.., to raise revenue to defray the expenses of govern-
ment and to distribute its burdens equably. '30 5 When uncon-
strained by state constitutional restrictions on the application
300. Robert C. Brown, The Nature of the Income Tax, 17 MINN. L. REV. 127, 139
(1933).
301. Id at 143-45; see also Matthews, supra note 34, ch. VIII, at 512.
302. In Sims v. Ahrens, 271 S.W. 720, 733 (Ark. 1925), one concurring justice of the
Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "of the various forms and kinds of excise taxes, a
tax on incomes holds its own place; it falls in its own particular and distinctive class,
and must not be confounded with occupation, license, franchise, and business taxes."
The Arkansas court thus treated the income tax as some sort of excise tax, but
recognized that it also possessed unique characteristics.
303. In Owen v. Fletcher Savings & Trust Co., 189 N.E. 173, 177 (Ind. 1934), the
Indiana Supreme Court held as follows:
An income tax is distinguished from other forms of taxation, in that it is not
levied upon property nor upon the operation of a trade, or business, or
subjects employed therein, nor upon the practice of a profession, the pursuit
of a trade or calling, but upon the acquisitions of the taxpayer arising from
one or more of these sources or from all combined. It is not a tax on property,
and a tax on property does not embrace income.
304. In Reed v. Bjornson, 253 N.W. 102, 105 (Minn. 1934), Minnesota's supreme
court held:
While income as it is received is necessarily property, a tax upon it has many
characteristics which differ quite radically from those of a tax levied upon
real or invested personal property. Income is a more fleeting or transitory
benefit which comes according to present efforts or the wisdom or luck of past
accumulations. Many people who own little or no tangible or intangible
property have large incomes and enjoy great benefit from the protection
which organized society affords.... An income tax is calculated to take toll
from the flow of this property to the individual through the arteries of
organized social life and to cause it to bear a share of the burden of
government. In many ways such a tax is sui generw.
305. Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1931).
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of property taxes, legislatures are accorded "very wide discre-
tion" in classifying and applying taxes so long as they are"neither capricious nor arbitrary... [and] there is no denial of
the equal protection of the law."-"" Washington's court simi-
larly has held that:
[IThe legislature possesses inherently a plenary power in the
matter of taxation, except as limited by the constitution. No
constitutional grant of the taxing power is needed. The four-
teenth amendment [the 1932 amendment to Article VII], like
the sections it replaces, is a limitation upon the legislature,
rather than a grant.30 7
The legislature is thus accorded "very wide discretion"3 °" in
imposing virtually any sort of tax it determines is appropri-
ately based on some lawful taxing policy of the state,3s so long
as the measure does not violate the constitution's uniformity
provisions when applicable, and so long as it is not arbitrary,
capricious, abusive or fraudulent,1 0 or "unreasonable, oppres-
sive and confiscatory. 3 1 1  When the legislature structures a
tax, building in classifications and rates, that enactment "is
presumptively valid, and the burden is upon the challenger to
prove that the questioned classification does not rest upon a
reasonable basis. ' '3 12
The members of the Washington court that formed the
306. Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910); see also Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 344-45 (1989); Allied Stores of Ohio v.
Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959); Forbes v. Seattle, 113 Wash. 2d 929, 944-45, 785 P.2d
431, 439 (1990).
307. State ex rel. Mason County Logging v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 73, 31 P.2d 539,
543 (1934).
308. Texas Company v. Cohn, 8 Wash. 2d 360, 368, 112 P.2d 522, 527 (1941).
309. Sonitrol Northwest Inc. v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 2d 588, 591, 528 P.2d 474, 477
(1974); Boeing Co. v. State, 74 Wash. 2d 82, 86, 442 P.2d 970, 972-73 (1968).
310. Texas Company v. Cohn, 8 Wash. 2d 360, 369, 112 P.2d 522, 534 (1941); Supply
Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178 Wash. 72, 72, 34 P.2d 363, 364 (1934); State ex rel. Stiner v.
Yelle, 174 Wash. 402, 407, 25 P.2d 91, 93 (1933).
311. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 649, 657, 21 P.2d 721, 724 (1933).
The Washington court also noted in State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164,
174-75, 96 P. 1047, 1049 (1908), that "[n]o method of taxation in its results can fully
accomplish all that the constitution declares shall be done.... Any method which can
be devised by the legislature must necessarily be defective in some particulars and
must fail to meet with exactness every standard set by the constitution."
Nevertheless, the court was willing in that case to allow the legislature to proceed with
a tax scheme that "reasonably comprehend[ed]" the constitution's requirements. Id. at
175, 96 P. at 1049.
312. Boeing Co. v. State, 74 Wash. 2d 82, 86, 442 P.2d 970, 973 (1968); see also High
Tide Seafoods v. State, 106 Wash. 2d 695, 698, 725 P.2d 411, 413 (1986), which upheld
Washington's tax on food fish and reiterated the principal that "[s]tatutes are
Washington State Income Tax
Culliton-Jensen majority may have felt compelled to categorize
the income tax as a property tax because that was one of the
familiar and available niches, and because the measure did not
look to them like an excise tax. But the majority also presum-
ably knew that labeling the income tax as a property tax
would prevent its implementation. Opponents of the income
tax on the court would therefore have recognized that catego-
rizing the tax as a property tax was a necessity. The justices
were fully aware of the legislature's broad discretion in the
realm of non-property taxes.31 3 They also knew that Washing-
ton's new uniformity language, having "entirely swept away"
an older, restrictive version,3 14 now required "nothing less than
a certain and unequivocal violation of some constitutional inhi-
bition" to warrant holding a tax inoperative.315 Additionally,
they should have known from their review of the constitu-
tional provisions of other states that several stricter versions
still existed in the country.3 1 6 In Newhouse's system of classi-
fying uniformity provisions, Washington's provision was, and
is, a Type XII clause, the most flexible.317 A Newhouse Type
XII clause provides that "taxes shall be uniform upon the same
class of property. 316
During the period in which Culliton and Jensen were
decided, six other states had Type XII clauses and thirteen
states had the somewhat less flexible Type XI version: "Taxes
shall be uniform upon the same class or subjects. '3 19  If the
presumed constitutional and a party challenging a statute has the burden of
establishing its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt ...."
313. See, e.g., Justice Steinert's opinion in Supply Laundry Co. v. Jenner, 178
Wash. 72, 75, 34 P.2d 363, 364, (1934).
314. State ex rel. Atwood v. Wooster, 163 Wash. 659, 662, 2 P.2d 653, 654 (1931).
315. State ex rel. Mason County Logging v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 71, 31 P.2d 539,
542 (1934).
316. Justice Holcomb's lead opinion in Culliton discussed the language of various
other uniformity provisions. Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 376-77, 25 P.2d 81, 83
(1983).
317. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1701.
318. Id. (emphasis added).
319. Id at 1701, 1720. At the time that Amendment 14 to the Washington State
Constitution was being approved, some believed that a Type XI clause referring to
"subjects" rather than "property" would have been more flexible. Roberts, supra note
46, at 226. This view is difficult to understand given that "property" is a narrower
classification than that denoted by the expansive term "subjects." In any event, of the
thirteen jurisdictions with Type XI clauses (Delaware, Pennsylvania, Georgia,
Louisiana, Missouri, Minnesota, Oregon, Colorado, Montana, Idaho, Oklahoma, New
Mexico and Virginia), all today have some form of individual or corporate income tax.
The courts in several of those jurisdictions upheld net income taxes under the Type XI
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Washington State Constitution had contained a Type XI clause,
the court could have determined that income was a "class" or a"subject" of taxation, which would require income to be taxed
at a uniform (i.e., flat) rate. But the state had such a liberal
provision that in order to block the income tax, the court had
to find that income was property, and in making that finding
the court converted what was intended to be a progressive
clause into one that now, in Newhouse's words, "approaches
the strictest end of the spectrum. ' 320 Pennsylvania, the only
other state whose court continues to view income as a form of
property, has the less flexible Type XI version,32 ' which makes
disapproval of the net income tax slightly more tenable.322 But
today, rejection of a net income tax under a Type XII clause
such as Washington's is altogether untenable.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE ONCE AND FUTURE NET INCOME TAX
In a 1978 commentary on Washington's income tax cases,
J. Thomas Carrato and Richard Hemstad offered an alterna-
tive approach to Article VII, Section 1.323 They persuasively
argued that even if income were treated as property, the 1932
amendment to Washington's uniformity clause grants the legis-
lature broad powers to classify property, other than real estate,
in such a way as to permit a net income tax.3 24 Although an
attractive approach, it simply is unnecessary to concede that
income is property. Furthermore, while Carrato and Hemstad
have successfully demonstrated that the Culliton-Jensen court
failed to recognize the full classification powers that the new
Article VII, Section 1, was meant to convey to the legislature,
the fact remains that if income is actually classified as prop-
erty, it might still be difficult for a court to uphold a tax law
that treats the first dollar earned differently from the last.
clauses. Some of those states have seen changes in their uniformity clauses since the
1930s. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1721-26.
320. NEWHOUSE, supra note 23, at 1902.
321. PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, states as follows: "All taxes shall be uniform, upon
the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax,
and shall be levied and collected under general laws."
322. Amidon v. Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971). It is interesting to note that
Pennsylvania has held only the personal net income tax to violate its uniformity
clause. That state's corporate income tax has been upheld as an excise tax for the
privilege of doing business, the amount of the tax measured by net income. Turco
Paint and Varnish Co. v. Kalodner, 184 A. 37 (Pa. 1936).
323. Carrato & Hemstad, supra note 26.
324. Id. at 272, 278. This classification argument is similar to that proposed by
Justice Blake in his Culliton dissent.
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The state constitution requires that all taxes be uniform
upon the same class of property, and while it would not be
unreasonable to hold that the legislature is empowered to
place different levels of income into different classes, the quad-
ruped analogies posed by Justices Mitchell and Steinert325 still
have some application today:
* A band of one thousand horses is not fundamentally dif-
ferent from a band of two thousand, except in number,
and the uniformity language of the state constitution
might well require that ten thousand cattle be taxed at
the same rate as one thousand cattle.
* Horses and cattle are property when they are owned by a
person, and so is money; but income flowing to a person
is different from money held in someone's hands.
" A dollar earned is appropriately taxed as income, but just
once. When that dollar is placed in a mattress, it is prop-
erty and can be taxed only by an intangible personal
property tax (if the government can find it in the
mattress).
" Once the dollar is taken out of the mattress and placed in
a bank, only the interest earned is taxed as income, again
just once, as income flows to its recipient. Once held,
either in a mattress or a bank account, that interest itself
becomes static property that can be taxed only by means
of a property tax.
As the Georgia court observed in 1878, property is the tree
and income is the fruit that can be taxed once and only once:
when it is picked.326
If the Washington State Legislature makes another
attempt to enact an income tax, the correct approach for Wash-
ington's court will be to face the issue head on by reversing the
two mistaken views that income is property,327 and that income
325. See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
326. Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93 (1878). See supra note 272 and accompanying
text.
327. The Washington court has been willing to reverse itself in the area of
taxation. See, e.g., Tekoa v. Reilly, 47 Wash. 202, 205, 91 P. 769, 769-70 (1907) (reversing
a prior holding concerning the classification of city residents for purposes of a
capitation (poll) tax and stating: "[I]f this court has heretofore erroneously restricted
the power of the legislature in the important matter of taxation we deem it our
highest duty to correct the error at the first opportunity."); State ex reL Washington
State Finance Committee v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 646, 384 P.2d 833, 834 (1963)
(overruling, prospectively, an earlier position that bonds backed by a dedicated
cigarette tax were not general obligation bonds and stating- 'rime is both enemy and
friend to a good idea. Thoughts held clearly in the beginning may obscure and lose
1993]
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from real estate is different from other business income.' s
Then, as Carrato and Hemstad have suggested, the court could
defer to the legislature's authority to tax net income differ-
ently at different levels so long as the lawmakers do not exer-
cise that power in an arbitrary, abusive or confiscatory
manner, or in any other manner that violates the rights of
persons.3 9
If the legislature desired to implement a graduated income
tax, but did not wish to attempt a net income tax for policy
reasons, it could simply adopt a graduated gross income tax.
Similarly, if the supreme court chose not to discard the fifty-
five-year-old labeling of a graduated net income tax as a prop-
erty tax, it too could adopt a graduated gross income tax. The
Culliton court suggested that it might approve an income tax
structured differently than the graduated net income tax
before it in that case,33 ' and it might be easier for the modern
their outline as the present merges with the future and becomes the past again.
Conversely, concepts vague in their beginnings may sharpen in form and shape by the
passing of years and the force of events.").
328. In Apartment Operators Assn. of Seattle v. Schumacher, 56 Wash. 2d 46, 47,
351 P.2d 124, 125 (1960), the court, without analysis, overturned the extension of the
B&O tax to rental income, ruling that "[t]he question is foreclosed by prior decisions of
this court," i.e., by Jensen. Treating a tax on gross income from property the same as a
direct tax on the property itself makes even less sense than categorizing income as
property across the beard. Almost all locally-earned business income can be said to
derive directly or indirectly from real property, because most businesses have a
physical situs.
329. Cary v. Bellingham, 41 Wash. 2d 468, 472, 250 P.2d 114, 117 (1952), held that
Washington cities are without authority to impose gross income taxes and stated that
employment is "one of those inalienable rights" rather than a privilege, like the
privilege to engage in business activity. While that case might be used to argue that
the legislature does not have the authority to impose a personal income tax, the Cary
court did not attempt to make that conceptual leap. It was clear in Cary that an
attempted city income tax could be barred solely on the grounds that municipalities, as
subdivisions of the state, had no express or implied authority to levy income taxes of
any sort. A bar against cities or counties imposing a net income tax is expressly set
forth in statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.65.030 (1989). See also Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1937), which rejected an argument that the social security
tax violated some type of "natural right" to employ workers: "We learn that
employment for lawful gain is a 'natural' or 'inherent' or 'inalienable' right, and not a
'privilege' at all. But natural rights, so called, are as much subject to taxation as rights
of less importance."
330. In his lead opinion in Culliton, Justice Holcomb wrote the following: "It may
be possible to frame an income tax law which will assess all incomes uniformly and
comply with our constitution, which, of course, is not now before us and we need not
consider it." Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 379, 25 P. 81, 84 (1933). Justice Steinert
stated: "We are not here concerned with an act relating to a uniform income tax, nor
are we concerned with the wisdom, expediency or desirability of any particular kind of
income tax. We are here concerned only with a graduated income tax act and its
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court to now approve a gross income tax because to do so
would not entail the complete overruling of Culliton and
Jensen.
Moreover, a gross income tax would not necessarily affect
businesses differently than the B&O tax, because, like the
B&O tax, it would not allow business taxpayers to deduct
expenses. Either the B&O tax could be retained as the basic
business tax, or a value added tax could be implemented. 3 '
For individuals, a graduated gross income tax would be a sig-
nificant change from the current state of affairs. While the dif-
ference between an individual taxpayer's adjusted gross and
taxable income is important to that person, the difference is
not so significant as to prevent a graduated tax on the higher
adjusted gross amount from being structured in a tolerably fair
manner.
Gross income is even less appropriately labeled property
than is net income, because gross income is farther from the
point of being a static asset in an owner's hands. One argu-
ment for asserting that net income might be property is that
before deductions, exemptions, and credits can be applied,
money must have come into the taxpayer's hands and
remained there, at rest, while the taxpayer's status (i.e., blind
constitutionality." Id. at 383, 25 P.2d at 85 (Steinert, J., concurring). Although Justice
Steinert's words can be interpreted to include a graduated gross income tax along with
a graduated net income tax, the gross income tax was not before the court in Culliton
or Jensen. Furthermore, in its opinions approving the B&O tax and the differential
application of that tax to different classes of businesses, the court has developed a
substantial body of law sustaining a levy on gross income.
331. The value added tax is common in western Europe and can be structured in
many ways. See STRAuss, supra note 11, at 107 et seq. Michigan is currently the only
American state with a value added tax. Michigan Single Business Tax Act, MCH.
COMP. LAWS § 208 (1986). The basic idea of the value added tax is that each business
pays a tax only on the portion of the commodity that represents the increased value
that firm has put into it. In doing so, multiple taxation is avoided. Value added taxes
can be based on consumption, on net income, or on gross product. Some value added
taxes permit a subject business to credit only external payments, such as payments for
raw materials or component parts. Other such taxes also allow a business credit for
internal costs such as labor, and this type of levy can become, in effect, a type of net
income tax. A form of value added tax was introduced in the Washington Legislature
in 1985. See H.B. 927, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1985). That proposal was based on gross
income and permitted credits only for external costs. Id. Under the Washington
constitution this would be the conceptual equivalent of, and indeed could be structured
as, a gross business receipts tax. The key difference between the 1985 proposed value
added tax and Washington's existing B&O tax is that by taxing gross receipts minus
purchases external to a firm, the tax disparities between vertically-integrated firms
and other companies would be eliminated. This approach would be permissible under
Stiner, and if drafted properly, would not likely encounter problems in the courts.
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or sighted, with or without dependents) was determined. This
argument for characterizing net income as property may be
weak, however, because income is "fruit,"'a because income of
any type does not necessarily remain with the individual, and
because gross income is converted to taxable net income only
for the purpose of determining how much will be taxed. Fur-
thermore, even this weak argument for characterizing net
income as property is not available with respect to gross
income; the legislature should be free to tax gross income in
any manner that is not arbitrary, abusive, or confiscatory. The
legislature could even tax gross income in a graduated manner.
If the legislature did not choose to implement a graduated
gross income tax, or if the court were unwilling to sustain any
type of graduated tax, a flat gross income tax is unquestionably
permissible, even when income is equated with property.333
From a policy standpoint the disadvantage of a flat tax is that,
after the $3,000 exemption available under the state constitu-
tion, it might not produce substantial state revenue if any addi-
tional exemptions or deductions were permitted. Since 1972,
Article VII, Section 2, has barred tax levies on real and per-
sonal property from "exceed[ing] one per centum of the true
and fair value of such property in money,"'' but a tax on gross
income would be levied on a form of property previously not
subject to any level of taxation, so it could be imposed at the
full one percent. Still, income would be a form of "personal
property"; therefore, Article VII, Section 1, would provide an
exemption for the first $3,000 of earnings.Y Finally, although
Jensen rejected a surtax and credit system meant to cushion
the effect of an income tax on low and moderate income per-
sons,33 Article VIII, Section 5, of Washington's constitution
would permit the legislature to enact a program of direct
grants, rather than credits, to the poor and the infirm, 3 so
332. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text.
333. A flat tax clearly would satisfy the Culliton requirement that one thousand
horses and two thousand horses be taxed alike. See supra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text.
334. Amendment 59, 1971 House Joint Resolution No. 47 (approved Nov. 1972);
Amendment 55, 1971 Senate Joint Resolution No. 1 (approved Nov. 1972). The
proposed amendments were submitted to the electors of the state at the same time,
with the proviso that they may vote for or against each separately, but if both were
approved and ratified, both would become part of the constitution.
335. See current text of WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (1988).
336. Jensen v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 209, 220, 53 P.2d 607, 611 (1936).
337. Article VIII, Section 5, bars the state from making gifts or loans. WASH.
CONST. art. VIII, § 5. Article VIII, Section 7, prohibits local governments from making
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that the tax could be made more graduated in nature. But
those grants, like deductions and exemptions, would adversely
affect the revenue generating potential of a flat gross income
tax.
But the Washington court need not limit the state to a
gross income tax, graduated or flat, because a graduated net
income tax should be upheld today if the legislature were to
deem it an appropriate method for raising revenue. The swing
votes (and lead opinion) in the 1933 Culliton decision barring
the voter-approved net income tax were based on a misconstru-
ing of the earlier ruling in Aberdeen. Aberdeen barely touched
on the question of whether "income" was "property," and the
brief extent to which it addressed that issue was in the context
of categorizing business income for the purpose of applying
federal Equal Protection tests that the Washington court
believed were applicable under Quaker City Cab Co. v. Penn-
sylvania."3s But the United States Supreme Court has now
reversed Quaker City Cab as well as MacAllen Co. v. Massachu-
setts3 39 and Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co." ° Those
three rulings had provided the underpinnings of Aberdeen,
Culliton, and Jensen. Given that Justice Holcomb's lead opin-
ion in Culliton was based on a misreading or conscious misrep-
resentation of Aberdeen, and given that in any event the
federal props now have been pulled out from underneath
Abderdeen, Washington's current court would be obliged to
approach the constitutionality of a net income tax de novo.
Today's court should also assume that legislative acts are valid,
placing the burden on anyone challenging the constitutionality
of a statute. Thus, opponents of a net income tax today would
face an uphill battle.
Furthermore, despite Justice Holcomb's assertion to the
contrary in Culliton, in 1933, a majority of the state courts that
had addressed the question had concluded that income was not
property. Today, that majority has grown so that only Wash-
gifts or loans to anyone except "the poor and infirm." WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 7.
The Washington court has extended the "poor and infirm" exception to the state as
well as its municipalities, and the court has also read the term "poor and infirm"
disjunctively, so that grants to offset an income tax could be made available either to
low-income persons or those with various infirmities. Health Care Facilities Auth. v.
Ray, 93 Wash. 2d 108, 115, 605 P.2d 1260, 1263-64 (1980).
338. Aberdeen Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Chase, 157 Wash. 851, 358-62, 289 P. 536,
540-41 (1930).
339. See notes 251, 252, 257 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 253-56 and accompanying text.
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ington, and Pennsylvania in part,341 remain with cases on the
books that treat income as a form of property. The nearly
unanimous view now recognizes that income is something in
motion, something that can either cease moving and itself
become an income-producing asset (i.e., "property") or that can
alternatively be consumed and disappear. When income is con-
verted into an asset, it is then appropriately treated, and taxed,
as property. But as a number of court opinions in other states
have observed, property is the tree and income is the fruit.
Both income and property may be taxed under the appropriate
rules, but it is illogical, and today quite rare, to treat them as
one and the same.
The decision on how to tax the tree and whether to tax
the fruit is appropriately left to the legislative branch. Wash-
ington's legislature might be reasonably satisfied with the cur-
rent structure of taxation in the state, and the mechanisms
that have prevailed since 1935 could remain in effect for many
years. But if external events, policy shifts, or initiatives chal-
lenging current tax methods were to cause legislators to seek a
change in the sales and B&O tax-based system, today's
lawmakers should consider a graduated net income tax as
being solidly among the available approaches.
341. See supra notes 321-22 and acccompanying text.
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